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ExEcutivE summary
•	 When	 the	Kremlin	decided	 to	attack	Ukraine,	 it	put	 its	geo-
political	objectives	above	the	economic	interests	of	Russia	and	
Russian	 business.	That	 decision	 engendered	major	 financial	
consequences	 for	 the	 Russian	 Federation.	 President	 Putin’s	
image	as	a	skilful	strategist	was	undermined	in	the	aftermath	
when	–	contrary	to	expectations	–	the	sanctions	turned	out	to	
be	a	lasting	problem.	Their	gradual	tightening	marked	a	fail-
ure	of	the	president’s	policy.	Therefore,	restoring	business	as	
usual	between	Russia	and	the	West,	which	was	the	Kremlin’s	
priority,	is	far	from	coming	true.	
•	 The	 personal	 sanctions	 imposed	 after	 2014	 by	 the	 United	
States	 and	 the	 European	Union	 targeted	 people	 in	Vladimir	
Putin’s	inner	circle,	among	others.	They	have	directly	affected	
the	wealth	of	the	Russian	ruling	elite,	including	the	president	
himself.	However,	since	Europe,	where	most	of	the	Russian	in-
vestments	were	located,	adopted	a	much	less	strict	sanctions	
policy	than	the	United	States,	Russian	oligarchs	have	managed	
to	effectively	mitigate	the	negative	 impacts	of	 the	sanctions.	
Still,	 in	 the	 initial	period	after	 the	 sanctions	were	 imposed,	
members	of	 the	Russian	business	elite	suffered	major	finan-
cial	losses.	They	were	also	forced	to	scale	down	or	close	their	
business	operations	abroad,	and	were	no	longer	free	to	travel	
internationally.	For	some	of	 them,	the	restrictions	meant	an	
involuntary	change	of	lifestyle,	as	they	could	no	longer	enjoy	
a	 life	of	 luxury	outside	Russia	and	had	 to	 restrict	 their	con-
tacts	with	the	international	elite.	The	sanctions	thus	became	
a	test	of	the	Russian	elite’s	loyalty	to	Vladimir	Putin.
•	 The	Kremlin	made	 its	first	efforts	 to	at	 least	partly	compen-
sate	a	 select	group	of	businessmen	 for	 the	 losses	 suffered	as	
a	result	of	the	sanctions	as	early	as	March	2014.	The	Russian	
state	apparatus	pursued	a	co-ordinated	policy	of	 supporting	
the	 oligarchs	 in	 the	 president’s	 inner	 circle	 at	 the	 expense	
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of	the	general	public.	The	state’s	aid	became	particularly	im-
portant	as	the	sanctions	continued	for	longer	than	originally	
expected.	The	 financial	 operations	 undertaken	 by	 oligarchs	
from	the	president’s	inner	circle	in	order	to	counter	the	sanc-
tions,	combined	with	assistance	provided	by	the	Russian	state,	
which	fostered	the	rapid	growth	of	their	businesses	in	Russia,	
helped	the	oligarchs	to	quickly	make	up	for	the	losses.	Within	
the	last	four	years,	the	value	of	the	assets	owned	by	several	of	
the	president’s	insiders	has	almost	returned	to	pre-sanctions	
levels.	However,	most	of	those	assets	now	are	under	Russian	
jurisdiction,	making	 the	 oligarchs	 even	more	 dependent	 on	
the	Kremlin.
•	 The	 sanctions	have	 limited	Russian	business’s	 opportunities	
to	expand	internationally,	while	the	prospects	for	the	Russian	
economy’s	growth	in	the	coming	years	are	not	particularly	op-
timistic.	This	 is	 fuelling	an	 intensifying	rivalry	over	 the	re-
maining	attractive	business	assets	in	Russia,	while	the	group	
of	potential	beneficiaries	who	stand	to	profit	from	close	rela-
tions	with	the	Kremlin	has	been	shrinking.
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introduction
Since	March	2014,	the	Russian	economy	has	been	functioning	under	
the	impact	of	the	sanctions	imposed	on	Russia	by	the	United	States,	
the	European	Union	and	a	number	of	other	Western	states	in	reac-
tion	to	Moscow’s	aggression	towards	Ukraine	and	its	annexation	of	
Crimea.	The	sanctions	have	created	many	restrictions	on	economic	
co-operation	between	the	Russian	Federation	and	Western	states.	
The	diplomatic	sanctions	have	been	the	least	painful	economically,	
although	they	have	hit	Russia’s	international	prestige,	with	the	ex-
clusion	of	Moscow	from	the	G8	grouping	of	the	world’s	most	influ-
ential	states,	the	suspension	of	its	accession	negotiations	with	the	
Organisation	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development,	and	the	
decision	by	Western	leaders	to	refrain	from	official	contacts	with	
the	Russian	leadership	during	the	initial	period.	The	sanctions	have	
also	barred	Russia’s	 access	 to	 international	finance;	 for	 example,	
the	World	Bank	and	all	its	agencies	have	suspended	the	financing	
of	new	projects	in	Russia,	and	the	European	Bank	for	Reconstruc-
tion	and	Development	has	taken	a	similar	decision.
The	Russian	economy	has	also	faced	sectorial	sanctions,	such	as	
limits	 on	 access	 to	 capital	 markets	 for	 the	 largest	 state-owned	
banks	in	Russia	and	several	state-owned	oil	and	defence	compa-
nies.	The	ban	also	covered	exports	of	arms	and	dual-purpose	ma-
terials	to	Russia,	as	well	as	selected	technologies	and	services	in	
the	oil	extraction	sector.	
Moreover,	personal	sanctions	have	been	imposed	on	selected	offi-
cials,	managers	of	state-owned	companies,	journalists,	and	private	
entrepreneurs	 from	 President	 Vladimir	 Putin’s	 inner	 circle.	The	
ensuing	restrictions	have	also	affected	companies	with	links	to	per-
sons	and	companies	involved	in	economic	relations	with	Crimea.1	
1	 The	United	States,	Canada,	the	European	Union	and	Norway	imposed	their	
sanctions	on	Russia	in	several	stages,	starting	on	20	March	2014.	They	have	
since	been	joined	by	Australia,	New	Zealand,	Japan,	Switzerland,	Iceland,	Al-
bania,	Macedonia	and	Liechtenstein	among	others.	For	more	on	the	sanctions	
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The	scope	of	sanctions	imposed	on	Russia	by	the	different	West-
ern	states	varies	widely.	The	United	States	has	imposed	the	most	
extensive	 restrictions	 on	 Russian	 entities.	 Moreover,	 the	 US	
sanctions	have	been	enshrined	 in	a	congressional	bill	 (CAATSA	
No	3364),2	which	means	that	lifting	them	will	be	a	long	and	com-
plex	process.	Moreover,	the	bill	obligates	the	US	president	to	fur-
ther	expand	the	sanctions	on	Russia.	In	the	case	of	the	European	
Union,	the	member	states	decide	every	six	months	to	extend	the	
current	sanctions	against	Russia	for	another	period.	
Analysis	 of	 the	Kremlin’s	 reactions	 and	 the	 state	 aid	 offered	 to	
selected	entrepreneurs	in	Vladimir	Putin’s	inner	circle	indicates	
that	while	 the	Russian	 leadership	has	consistently	played	down	
the	impact	of	the	Western	sanctions	on	the	Russian	economy,	the	
sanctions	have	proven	painful	 for	 the	Kremlin,	 and	have	 led	 to	
rising	tensions	within	the	Russian	elite.
*
The	present	paper	aims	to	show	how	the	personal	sanctions	have	
affected	entrepreneurs	regarded	as	members	of	the	Kremlin	elite	
and	the	providers	of	its	economic	base,	specifically	Gennady	Tim-
chenko,	the	brothers	Arkady	and	Boris	Rotenberg,	and	Yuri	Ko-
valchuk.
The	first	part	discusses	the	nature	of	the	Kremlin	elite	and	the	po-
sition	of	selected	businessmen	within	it,	as	well	as	the	sanctions	
imposed	on	them	and	the	impact	on	their	assets.	Part	II	looks	into	
imposed	by	the	United	States,	see	the	US	Department	of	State,	2018,	https://
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx;	
For	more	on	the	sanctions	imposed	by	the	EU,	see	the	European	Council,	2018,	
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/	
2	 See	the	US	Congress,	https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-
bill/3364/text;	For	more	information,	see	I.	Wiśniewska,	S.	Kardaś,	‘Ustawa	
o	amerykańskich	sankcjach	przeciwko	Rosji’,	Analizy OSW,	4	August	2017,	
https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2017-08-04/ustawa-o-
amerykanskich-sankcjach-przeciwko-rosji
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the	mechanisms	the	oligarchs	have	exploited	to	evade	the	sanc-
tions.	Part	III	discusses	the	elaborate	system	of	assistance	offered	
by	the	Russian	state	to	selected	entrepreneurs,	including	awards	
of	public	contracts	and	tax	breaks	in	Russia.	Finally,	part	IV	pre-
sents	the	consequences	of	the	sanctions	and	reactions	to	them	for	
the	Russian	economy	and	its	economic	governance	model,	as	well	
as	the	relations	within	the	Kremlin	elite.
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i. WEstErn sanctions – a bloW 
to PrEsidEnt Putin’s friEnds
1. The new private oligarchs in Russia 
Since	the	beginning	of	Vladimir	Putin’s	rule	in	Russia,	the	state’s	
role	 in	 the	economy	has	been	expanding.	The	nationalisation	of	
assets	has	progressed	in	parallel	to	consolidation,	leading	to	the	
emergence	of	large-state	owned	corporations.	Economic	govern-
ance	 has	 become	 increasingly	 centralised,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 which	
competition	has	dwindled	 and	 corruption	has	been	on	 the	 rise.	
According	to	estimates	by	the	Federal	Anti-Monopoly	service	of	
the	Russian	Federation,	the	state	accounted	for	around	70%	of	the	
GDP	in	2015,	compared	to	only	35%	of	GDP	a	decade	before.3	
The	process	of	nationalisation	has	been	accompanied	by	measures	
to	 strengthen	 the	 Kremlin’s	 control	 over	 private	 business.	The	
Yukos	case	was	a	turning	point	for	the	efficacy	of	that	process,4	
as	it	was	the	moment	where	the	Kremlin	displayed	the	tools	and	
mechanisms	 through	which	 it	would	control	 the	private	 sector,	
such	 as	 the	 full	 pliancy	 of	 state	 institutions.	The	 end	 of	 Putin’s	
first	term	and	the	beginning	of	the	second	in	particular	marked	
a	period	when	many	private	entrepreneurs	lost	their	businesses	
and	moved	abroad.	 In	 the	aftermath,	big	business	 in	Russia	be-
came	fully	subordinated	to	the	Kremlin.	The	Russian	leadership	
also	 imposed	new	conditions	 for	 its	co-operation	with	business:	
businessmen	 are	 banned	 from	 ‘meddling’	 with	 political	 affairs	
and	have	 to	 share	 their	profits	as	part	of	 their	 ‘corporate	 social	
responsibility’,	for	instance	by	supporting	the	implementation	of	
3	 See	 the	 Federal	Anti-Monopoly	 Service	 of	 the	Russian	Federation,	 2016,	
Доклад о состоянии конкуренции в Российской Федерации за 2016 год, https://
fas.gov.ru/documents/596439
4	 For	more	information,	see	W.	Konończuk,	‘The	“Yukos	Affair”,	its	Motives	
and	Implications’,	OSW Studies,	15	July	2006,	https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/2006-08-15/yukos-affair-its-motives-and-implications
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important	social	programmes	or	infrastructural	projects	(such	as	
the	Olympic	facilities	for	the	2014	Games	in	Sochi).
However,	 against	 the	backdrop	of	 those	general	 trends,	 a	 small	
group	 of	 new	 private	 oligarchs	 has	 emerged	 in	 Russia,	 whose	
wealth	 has	 grown	 dynamically	 under	 Vladimir	 Putin’s	 rule.	 In	
particular,	this	group	includes	four	men	with	whom	Putin	built	
close	 relations	 back	 in	 St.	 Petersburg:	 Gennady	 Timchenko,	
Arkady	and	Boris	Rotenberg,	and	Yuri	Kovalchuk5	 (see	Figure	1	
ona	page	15	for	more	information).	
Yuri	Kovalchuk	 is	 the	man	who	created	an	elite	 summer	house	
co-operative	on	Lake	Komsomolskoye	in	the	1990s,	together	with	
Putin	and	a	group	of	friends	from	St.	Petersburg	(which	also	in-
cluded	 Nikolai	 Shamalov).	 The	 president’s	 friendship	 with	 the	
Rotenberg	brothers	dates	back	to	his	teenage	years	when	the	three	
men	practiced	martial	arts	together	in	what	was	then	Leningrad.	
And	Gennady	Timchenko,	who	first	started	dealing	in	oil	exports	
in	the	1980s	in	Leningrad,	has	co-operated	with	Vladimir	Putin	
since	the	early	1990s,	when	the	current	president	headed	the	In-
ternational	Co-operation	Department	of	the	city	hall	of	Leningrad	
(subsequently	renamed	St.	Petersburg).
President	 Putin	 reaffirmed	 his	 close	 acquaintance,	 and	 even	
friendly	 relations	 with	 Timchenko,	 Kovalchuk	 and	 the	 Roten-
bergs	during	his	2014	televised	conference	with	the	public,	when	
he	was	asked	about	 the	Western	 sanctions.	He	 said:	 “Yes,	 these	
are	my	good	acquaintances	and	 friends	 […].	 I’m	not	ashamed	of	
my	friends.”6
5	 Two	years	ago,	Kirill	Shamalov	joined	this	group.	He	is	the	son	of	Nikolai	
Shamalov,	also	considered	to	be	a	member	of	the	president’s	closest	circle	of	
friends	during	this	St.	Petersburg	time,	and	probably	a	former	son-in-law	of	
the	president.	In	2017,	Kirill	Shamalov	made	the	Forbes	rankings,	for	a	second	
time,	with	assets	worth	US$1.3	billion,	ranking	74th.	
6	 The	president’s	televised	conferences	with	the	public	are	propaganda	exer-
cises	carefully	staged	by	the	Kremlin.	The	question	about	sanctions	imposed	
on	businesspeople,	asked	in	April	2014,	was	not	accidental	either.	The	way	it	
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These	businessmen	have	built	their	current	wealth	by	doing	busi-
ness	in	sectors	of	strategic	importance	for	the	Kremlin,	including	
energy,	banking,	the	media	and	providing	services	to	state-owned	
companies.	Oil	trade	is	the	area	where	Timchenko,	the	wealthi-
est	among	 them,	has	been	 the	most	 successful	 (in	2018,	accord-
ing	to	Forbes,	his	assets	were	worth	an	estimated	US$16.8	billion).	
His	 company	Gunvor	 accounted	 for	 as	much	 as	 40%	 of	 Russia’s	
oil	 trade	 in	 the	 2000s.7	 Stroytransgaz,	 a	 construction	 company	
controlled	by	Timchenko	became,	alongside	the	Rotenberg	broth-
ers’	Stroygazmontazh,	one	of	the	main	contractors	for	the	multi-
billion	infrastructure	projects	implemented	by	state-owned	con-
cerns	 including	Gazprom	 and	Rosneft.	The	Rotenberg	 brothers,	
like	Kovalchuk,	have	also	been	very	successful	in	banking.	Their	
banks,	SMP	Bank	and	Bank	Rossiya,	are	currently	among	the	top	
thirty	banks	in	Russia.	Kovalchuk	has	furthermore	managed	to	
create	 one	 of	 the	 largest	 private	media	 companies	 in	Russia,	 in	
a	market	dominated	by	state-owned	players.
The	men	have	invested	some	of	their	proceeds	from	their	Russian	
operations	abroad.	This	has	been	a	way	to	reduce	costs,	diversify	
businesses	and	boost	their	financial	security	by	removing	some	
of	 their	 capital	 from	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	Russia,	where	property	
rights	are	not	respected.	However,	there	is	very	limited	informa-
tion	 available	 on	 the	 volume	 of	 capital	 expatriated	 from	Russia	
by	 specific	 entrepreneurs.	 Many	 such	 operations	 were	 carried	
out	 via	 tax	 havens,	 and	 the	 real	 owners	may	 be	 hiding	 behind	
was	phrased	was	very	telling:	“The	sanctions	[…]	affected	representatives	of	
big	business,	such	as	Yuri	Kovalchuk	or	Gennady	Timchenko	and	the	Roten-
berg	brothers;	many	of	them	are	associated	with	yourself	[Putin],	are	report-
edly	part	of	your	inner	circle	and	owe	their	wealth	to	their	acquaintance	
with	yourself.	Now	it	turns	out	that	they	also	owe	the	sanctions	[...]	to	their	
acquaintance	with	you	[…].	Don’t	you	feel	that	you	are	the	main	target	of	the	
sanctions?”.	See	the	official	Kremlin	website:	Прямая линия с Владимиром 
Путиным,	17	April	2014,	http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20796
7	 Timchenko	has	been	a	Swiss	tax	resident	since	2002.	In	the	period	1999–2001	
he	paid	his	taxes	in	Finland;	according	to	the	Finnish	tax	service	his	revenues	
rose	ten-fold	within	those	three	years,	to	€4.9	billion	(in	declared	taxable	
income)	in	2002.
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intermediaries.8	The	 scale	 of	 the	 phenomenon	was	 revealed	 by	
a	journalistic	investigation	which	looked	into	confidential	docu-
ments	of	 the	financial	operations	 (some	of	 them	 illegal)	carried	
out	by	public	personalities	from	many	countries,	including	Rus-
sia,	leaked	by	the	law	firms	handling	those	transactions	(known	
as	the	Panama	Papers9	or	Paradise	Papers).	
The	entrepreneurs	in	question	have	often	invested	in	real	estate	
abroad,	buying	homes	 in	which	 they	 themselves	or	members	of	
their	families	would	spend	the	better	part	of	the	year	(as	exam-
ples,	Arkady	Rotenberg	owned	several	villas	in	Italy	via	compa-
nies	incorporated	in	tax	havens;	his	brother	Boris	had	properties	
in	Latvia,	and	Timchenko	in	France	and	Switzerland),	they	would	
adopt	citizenship	of	Western	states	(Timchenko	and	Boris	Roten-
berg	hold	Finnish	passports	 in	addition	 to	Russian	citizenship),	
and	sent	their	children	to	schools	and	universities	in	the	West.10
The	 fact	 that	 Timchenko,	 the	 Rotenbergs	 and	 Kovalchuk	 have	
been	able	to	build	up	their	private	business	empires	proves	that	
they	occupy	strong	positions	within	the	Putinist	power	elite.	That	
elite	 consists	 of	 Putin’s	 close	 aides	 in	 the	 state	 administration,	
business	and	the	defence	and	security	sectors,	most	of	whom	hail	
from	St.	Petersburg	and	hold	significant	sway	over	Russia’s	poli-
cy.11	 Significantly,	 the	 group	 is	 covert	 and	 informal,	with	many	
8	 For	more	information,	see	OCCRP	2018,	How to Hide a Russian Fortune on the 
French Riviera,	21	February	2018,	https://www.occrp.org/en/about-us/28-
ccwatch/cc-watch-indepth/7675-how-to-hide-a-russian-fortune-on-the-
french-riviera
9	 For	more	information,	see	M.	Domańska,	‘The	Russian	aspects	of	the	“Pana-
ma	scandal”’,	OSW Analyses,	6	June	2016,	https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pub-
likacje/analyses/2016-04-06/russian-aspects-panama-scandal
10	 For	example,	two	children	from	Arkady	Rotenberg’s	second	marriage	live	
with	his	former	wife	in	London;	Roman,	the	son	of	Boris	Rotenberg,	went	to	
school	in	Helsinki	and	has	studied	in	London;	and	Ksenia	Frank,	Gennady	
Timchenko’s	daughter,	has	graduated	from	the	University	of	Edinburgh.
11	 The	main	criterion	for	membership	in	the	Kremlin	elite	is	personal	ties:	most	
members	of	the	power	elite	originate	from	Putin’s	milieu	from	the	times	
when	he	worked	at	 the	KGB	(the	First	Chief	Directorate	 for	 intelligence)	
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of	 its	members	holding	no	public	 functions.	The	Putinist	 estab-
lishment	is	not	homogenous,	and	tensions	and	divisions	exist	be-
tween	different	 interest	groups.	These	conflicts	mainly	concern	
the	 division	 of	 spheres	 of	 influence,	 assets	 and	 means.	 As	 the	
available	financial	resources	and	opportunities	to	 invest	abroad	
have	shrunk,	so	this	rivalry	has	intensified,	and	the	positions	of	
some	members	of	the	elite	have	eroded.	As	a	result,	no	member	
of	the	Russian	establishment	can	rest	assured	as	to	the	safety	of	
their	position,	and	all	have	to	make	constant	efforts	to	build	up	
their	standing	by	demonstrating	that	they	are	still	useful	for	the	
system.	Putin,	who	has	 consolidated	 this	narrow	group	around	
himself,	 acts	 as	 the	 arbiter,	 balancing	 the	 different	 interests	
within	the	ruling	establishment.	However,	his	role	as	an	arbiter	
has	been	waning	in	recent	years,	as	revealed	by	the	ever	fiercer	
and	increasingly	public	conflicts	within	the	highest	tiers	of	lead-
ership.12	Paradoxically,	Putin	also	depends	on	the	elite,	thanks	to	
which	the	system	functions	and	enables	him	to	stay	in	power.	This	
has	forced	the	Russian	president	to	take	certain	actions	to	dem-
onstrate	that	he	remains	a	strong	leader	and	can	still	guarantee	
benefits	to	members	of	the	establishment.
in	 the	 years	 1975–1990,	 and	 in	 the	 St.	 Petersburg	City	Hall	 in	 the	 years	
1991–1996.	The	 key	members	 of	 the	 elite	 are	 former	 Soviet	 intelligence	
functionaries	(including	Igor	Sechin	and	Sergei	Chemezov),	entrepreneurs	
(Gennady	Timchenko,	Yuri	Kovalchuk,	the	Rotenberg	brothers)	as	well	as	
lawyers,	economists	and	researchers	(Dmitri	Medvedev,	Alexey	Kudrin).	
In	recent	years,	several	people	including	Sergei	Ivanov,	Vladimir	Yakunin	
and	the	brothers	Sergei	and	Andrei	Fursenko	have	lost	their	positions	in	the	
Kremlin	elite.	See	J.	Rogoża,	‘“The	power	gained,	we	will	never	surrender”:	
the	Russian	ruling	elite	versus	the	succession	and	economic	crisis’,	OSW 
Point of View,	 15	 October	 2009,	 https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
point-view/2009-10-15/power-gained-we-will-never-surrender-russian-
ruling-elite-versus	For	a	description	of	the	current	model	of	governance	in	
Russia	and	the	positions	of	the	individual	establishment	members,	see	the	
report	Politburo 2.0,	Minchenko	Consulting,	23	August	2017,	http://www.
minchenko.ru/analitika/analitika_74.html
12	 OSW	team,	‘Putin	for	the	fourth	time.	The	state	of	and	prospects	for	Russia’,	
OSW Report,	20	March	2018,	https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/
report_putin-for-the-fourth_net.pdf
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Timchenko,	 the	 Rotenbergs	 and	 Kovalchuk	 share	 sports	 inter-
ests	with	the	president	(hockey,	martial	arts)	and	enjoy	friendly	
relations	with	Putin,	which	means	they	can	often	meet	him	and	
lobby	for	their	interests;	they	are	also	able	to	influence	decisions	
taken	in	the	Kremlin,	especially	on	economic	issues	including	the	
distribution	of	public	revenues.	However,	they	owe	their	strong	
position	largely	to	the	role	they	have	likely	played	in	building	up	
the	personal	wealth	of	the	president	and	his	close	relations.	The	
names	 of	Kovalchuk	 and	 the	Rotenbergs	 appear	 in	 the	Panama	
Papers,	among	other	dossiers.	The	journalists	behind	that	inves-
tigation	have	suggested	that	Bank	Rossiya	was	involved	in	money	
laundering	and	opaque	transactions	with	people	close	to	the	pres-
ident,	of	which	Putin	himself	was	the	beneficiary.13	
Figure 1. Assets of selected Russian businesspeople according to 
Forbes (US$ billions) 
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[US$ billions]
source: Forbes 2017, http://www.forbes.ru/rating/342579-200-bogateyshih-
biznesmenov-rossii-2017
* 2018 figures as of 6 June; figures for the remaining years as of February/
March. As a result of the new sanctions imposed on Russia by the United States 
on 6 April 2018, the stock-exchange value of the companies owned by the en-
trepreneurs has declined, although in recent weeks the companies have been 
recovering. For instance, in March 2018, Forbes estimated the wealth of the 
Rotenberg family at US$5.45 billion. 
13	 See	OCCRP	2018,	Russia: Banking on Influence,	https://www.occrp.org/en/
panamapapers/rossiya-putins-bank/
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2. Western sanctions against Putin’s friends
The	United	States	has	imposed	more	painful	restrictions	on	Russia	
than	any	other	Western	state,	putting	the	largest	number	of	Rus-
sian	 nationals	 and	 their	 companies	 under	 restrictions.	 Gennady	
Timchenko,	 Yuri	 Kovalchuk	 and	 the	 brothers	 Arkady	 and	 Boris	
Rotenberg	were	put	on	the	US	sanctions	list	as	soon	as	20	March	
2014.14	 All	 their	 assets	 in	 the	United	 States	were	 frozen,	 and	US	
companies	and	companies	doing	business	in	the	United	States	were	
prohibited	 from	entering	any	transactions	with	 those	persons	or	
companies	 they	 controlled.	 The	 sanctioned	 persons	 were	 also	
banned	from	entering	the	United	States.	Initially,	the	restrictions	
applied	to	legal	persons	in	which	any	of	the	individuals	facing	sanc-
tions	controlled	a	stake	of	at	least	50%.	However,	in	August	2014	the	
restrictions	were	extended	to	include	companies	in	which	different	
persons	under	sanctions	together	held	at	least	50%	of	shares	(for	in-
stance,	shared	assets	in	the	US	were	held	by	Kovalchuk	and	Roten-
berg,	or	by	Rotenberg	and	Timchenko).	In	July	2015,	the	US	sanc-
tions	were	also	extended	to	Roman	Rotenberg	(son	of	Boris),	and	
in	April	2018	to	Igor	Rotenberg	(son	of	Arkady).	Of	this	group,	the	
European	Union’s	sanctions	were	imposed	only	on	Yuri	Kovalchuk	
and	Arkady	Rotenberg15	 (in	 July	2014).	The	European	restrictions	
envisaged	a	freeze	on	those	persons’	European	assets	and	a	prohibi-
tion	on	obtaining	visas	and	travelling	to	Europe.	
14	 See	US	Department	of	State,	2018,	https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/
press-releases/Pages/jl23331.aspx	
15	 Arkady	Rotenberg	appealed	the	decision	imposing	sanctions	on	him.	In	au-
tumn	2016	the	European	Court	of	Justice	ruled	that	the	sanctions	imposed	
on	him	by	the	EU	Council	between	July	2014	and	March	2015	had	been	un-
justified,	but	upheld	the	sanctions	imposed	later.	According	to	the	Court,	
the	benefits	which	Rotenberg	derived	from	his	connections	with	Russian	
decision	makers	(including	Putin)	before	early	2015	could	not	have	affected	
the	situation	in	Ukraine.	However,	it	ruled	that	the	sanctions	imposed	on	
Rotenberg	after	March	2015	were	justified,	because	in	that	period	Roten-
berg	was	among	the	people	responsible	for	Russia’s	actions	or	policy	against	
Ukraine	(for	example,	as	a	shareholder	of	Giprotransmost	or	as	a	member	of	
the	board	of	the	Prosveshcheniye	publishing	house).	For	more	information,	
see	General	Court	of	the	European	Union,	https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/up-
load/docs/application/pdf/2016-11/cp160131en.pdf
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Timchenko,	 who	 held	 extensive	 assets	 outside	 Russia,	 was	 the	
most	 exposed	 to	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 sanctions.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	
Rotenberg	 brothers	 and	Kovalchuk,	 the	 sanctions	were	 painful	
because	the	banks	they	controlled	were	dependent	on	the	inter-
national	financial	markets	and	Western	technologies.	In	addition	
to	 the	 direct	 consequences	 of	 being	 under	 personal	 sanctions,	
these	men’s	assets	were	also	hit	indirectly	by	other	Western	sanc-
tions,	 including	sectorial	 restrictions	and	restrictions	on	access	
to	Western	capital.16	Many	Western	companies,	including	banks,	
changed	their	attitudes	towards	their	erstwhile	Russian	partners	
and	withdrew	 from	co-operation.	 In	 addition,	uncertainty	 over	
future	developments	regarding	Russia,	especially	the	US	bill	on	
sanctions	against	Russia	and	the	extension	of	US	restrictions	in	
April	2018,	as	well	as	pledges	to	take	further	action,	discouraged	
potential	business	partners	from	making	deals	with	Russian	en-
trepreneurs,	 and	 adversely	 affected	 the	 capitalisation	 of	 their	
business	assets.17
The	impact	of	economic	sanctions	was	compounded	by	the	sudden	
decline	in	oil	prices	in	late	2014,	which	exacerbated	the	economic	
crisis	in	Russia	and	drove	down	the	revenues	and	stock	exchange	
values	of	Russian	businesses.	The	economic	slump	in	Russia	ini-
tially	brought	 the	 implementation	of	many	 infrastructural	pro-
jects	in	Russia	to	a	halt,	including	projects	carried	out	jointly	by	
the	companies	owned	by	Timchenko	and	the	Rotenbergs,	such	as	
Gazprom’s	Power	of	Siberia	gas	pipeline	connecting	Russian	gas	
16	 For	more	information,	see	E.	Fiszer,	J.	Rogoża,	‘Further	EU	sanctions	against	
Russia’,	OSW Analyses,	 6	 August	 2014,	 https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/pub-
likacje/analyses/2014-08-06/further-eu-sanctions-against-russia
17	 The	imposition	in	April	2018	of	US	sanctions	on	Oleg	Deripaska,	one	of	Rus-
sia’s	richest	entrepreneurs,	and	his	companies	including	Rusal,	one	of	the	
world’s	largest	aluminium	producers,	caused	the	Russian	currency	to	dive	by	
15%	and	the	Russian	stock	exchanges	to	decline	considerably.	For	more	infor-
mation,	see	M.	Menkiszak,	‘A	test	of	strength.	The	escalation	of	the	crisis	in	
Russian-American	relations’,	OSW Commentary,	11	April	2018,	https://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2018-04-11/a-test-strength-
escalation-crisis-russian-american-relations
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fields	with	China.	However,	 as	 the	prices	 of	 oil,	 and	hence	 also	
export	 revenues,	 increased	again,	most	of	 the	projects	were	 re-
sumed.
In	 Timchenko’s case,	 the	 direct	 cost	 of	 sanctions	 imposed	 on	
his	foreign	assets	proved	limited.	The	Visa	and	MasterCard	pay-
ment	card	systems	blocked	his	private	credit	cards,	but	his	assets	
were	not	frozen	as	they	were	concentrated	in	Europe,	where	he	
did	not	face	sanctions.	Such	of	his	Russian	assets	that	were	sanc-
tioned	could	no	longer	do	business	with	US	partners;	this	applies,	
inter	alia,	 to	 the	Volga	Group	via	which	Timchenko	controls	all	
his	business	assets,	the	infrastructure	contractor	Stroytransgaz,	
as	well	 as	Transoil,	 the	 rail	 company	 servicing	mainly	 the	Ust-
Luga	 terminal,	 and	 Sakhatrans	 (a	Yakutia	 transport	 company),	
and	especially	Novatek,	Russia’s	second	largest	gas	producer	after	
Gazprom,	in	which	Timchenko	holds	23%	of	the	shares.
The	sanctions	imposed	on	Timchenko’s	companies	hindered	their	
access	to	capital	and	technology,	leading	to	problems	with	the	con-
struction	of	the	transport	and	reloading	coal	terminal	in	the	port	
of	Vanino	in	Yakutia18	and	a	nearly	two-year	delay	to	the	Yamal	
LNG	 terminal,	 a	 priority	 project	 for	 Novatek	 which	 has	 been	
strongly	supported	by	the	Kremlin.19	An	agreement	with	Russian	
and	Chinese	banks	to	finance	the	project	was	only	signed	in	2016.
Timchenko	also	suffered	some	losses	when	the	United	States	im-
posed	separate	sanctions	on	the	Rossiya	Bank	in	which	he	is	a	mi-
nority	shareholder	(more	information	on	this	below).
18	 For	more	 information,	see	 ‘Сахатранс	испытывает	трудности	со	стро-
и	тель	ством	угольного	терминала	из-за	санкций	к	Volga	Group	Тим-
ченко’,	Морские вести России,	2	March	2015,	http://www.morvesti.ru/de-
tail.php?ID=32056
19	 For	more	information,	see	И.	Гладышева,	‘Льгота	на	газ:	как	государство	
по	мо	гло	построить	Ямал	СПГ’,	РБК,	11	December	2017,	https://www.rbc.ru/
opinions/business/11/12/2017/5a2e37599a79476b576c3f91
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Timchenko	had	previously	downsized	his	stake	to	safe	levels	(be-
low	50%)	or	sold	his	foreign	companies	altogether.	By	doing	so	he	
shielded	 them	from	the	US	sanctions,	 so	 they	could	continue	 to	
do	 business	with	 US	 partners.	The	 hasty	 sale	 undoubtedly	 had	
a	negative	impact	on	Timchenko’s	wealth,	but	as	the	value	of	most	
of	the	deals	was	not	disclosed	(as	a	trade	secret),	it	is	difficult	to	
estimate	the	scale	of	his	losses.	At	the	same	time	the	sanctions	did	
undermine	the	repute,	credibility	and	ratings	of	his	companies,	
which	affected	their	stock	exchange	value.
The	sanctions	initially	delivered	a	heavy	blow	to	the	business	of	the	
Rotenberg	brothers.	Even	though	they	had	no	assets	in	the	United	
States,	 the	 sanctions	hit	 the	 SMP	Bank	 (one	 of	Russia’s	 top	 thirty	
banks	in	terms	of	assets)	which	they	own.	When	the	first	sanctions	
were	imposed	on	Russia	and	on	the	Rotenbergs	personally	(in	March	
2014),	 the	Bank,	 even	 though	 it	was	not	 sanctioned	 itself,	 stopped	
being	 serviced	 by	 Visa	 and	MasterCard	 for	 several	 days,	 trigger-
ing	panic	among	its	customers	and	a	bank	run.	When	the	bank	was	
included	in	the	sanctions	list	in	late	April	2014,	it	was	permanently	
disconnected	from	the	international	payment	card	systems.	On	top	
of	that,	all	American	IT	companies	discontinued	their	business	rela-
tions	with	the	bank,	including	Microsoft,	Oracle	and	the	anti-virus	
system	provider	Symantec.	The	bank	also	lost	the	ability	to	commu-
nicate	with	 its	customers	via	 the	Bloomberg	and	Reuters	systems.	
It	lost	access	to	the	London	stock	exchange	and	the	Chicago	commod-
ity	exchange;	 its	dollar	account	with	 JPMorgan	Chase	was	 frozen,	
and	Bank	of	America	and	the	US-based	broker	FXCM	discontinued	
co-operation	(the	frozen	assets	are	estimated	at	around	US$65	mil-
lion20).	Deposits	by	individual	customers	fell	by	nearly	15%	between	
March	and	May	2014	(to	70	billion	roubles,	i.e.	US$2	billion),	while	
deposits	of	 legal	persons	 increased	by	more	than	20%	to	51	billion	
20	 For	more	information,	see	‘Банкам	друзей	Путина	разрешат	оперировать	
деньгами	бюджета’,	РБК,	1	April	2016,	http://www.rbc.ru/economics/01/0
4/2016/56fe92989a7947340040e8af
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roubles	 (US$1.5	 billion).21	 The	 Owental	 Stock	 Investments	 hedge	
fund	registered	 in	Cyprus,	which	had	 links	to	the	Rotenbergs	(ac-
cording	 to	 the	 register,	 it	was	owned	by	Denis	Pospelov,	 a	 former	
deputy	CEO	of	SMP	Bank)	also	lost	the	ability	to	make	deals	in	US	
stock	exchanges.22	After	Arkady	Rotenberg	was	put	on	the	EU	sanc-
tions	list	in	July	2014	(as	the	only	member	of	the	family	to	face	Eu-
ropean	sanctions),	the	following	September	the	Italian	fiscal	police	
blocked	those	of	his	properties	(villa	and	hotels)	in	Italy	which	were	
formerly	 owned	 by	 the	 Cypriot	 company	 Olpon	 Investments	 Ltd.	
US	 sanctions	 were	 also	 imposed	 on	 the	 Rotenbergs’	 Stroygaz-
montazh	 company,	 one	 of	 the	 largest	 infrastructure	 contrac-
tors	 in	Russia.	The	company	co-owns	SGM-Most	 (also	under	US	
sanctions),	which	had	been	building	the	bridge	across	the	Kerch	
Strait	that	connects	Russia	with	Crimea.	While	these	companies	
mainly	 operate	 on	 the	 Russian	market,	 the	 sanctions	 deprived	
them	 of	 access	 to	 technology,	 which	made	 it	 more	 difficult	 for	
them	 to	 implement	 their	 projects.	 Because	 of	 the	 sanctions,	 no	
Western	financial	institutions	agreed	to	insure	the	construction	
of	 the	 Kerch	 Bridge.	 Russian	 financial	 institutions	 (especially	
state-owned	banks)	were	also	wary	of	the	potential	consequences	
of	getting	involved	in	the	project,	for	fear	of	the	possible	imposi-
tion	of	US	sanctions.	Stroygazmontazh	finally	managed	to	sign	an	
insurance	contract	with	an	anonymous	company	from	Crimea	in	
April	2016,23	after	a	Turkish	ship	had	damaged	the	bridge	pylons	
in	March	that	year.24	The	road	bridge	across	the	Kerch	Strait	was	
21	 Banki.ru,	http://www.banki.ru/banks/ratings/
22	 А.	Вержбицкий,	 ‘Плата	за	дружбу:	как	банк	Ротенбергов	переживает	
санкции’,	Forbes,	13	April	2015, http://www.forbes.ru/finansy/igroki/285505-
plata-za-druzhbu-kak-bank-rotenbergov-perezhivaet-sanktsii
23	 For	more	information,	see	М.	Каверина,	Е.	Мереминская,	‘Керченский	
мост	застраховала	неизвестная	крымская	компания’, Ведомости,	9	June	
21016, https://www.vedomosti.ru/finance/articles/2016/06/09/644725-
kerchenskii-most
24	 For	more	information,	see	Турецкий сухогруз снес опоры строящегося мос­
та через Керченский пролив, Lenta.ru,	 22	March	2016,	https://lenta.ru/
news/2016/03/22/bridge/
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put	into	operation	six	months	before	the	scheduled	opening	date	
(May	2018),	but	 the	railway	bridge	will	be	opened	after	a	year’s	
delay	(in	December	2019).	Moreover,	an	investigation	is	underway	
in	the	Netherlands	against	Dutch	companies	accused	of	illegally	
supplying	heavy	equipment	for	the	purposes	of	the	project.25	
Like	Timchenko,	the	Rotenbergs	have	probably	also	suffered	loss-
es	as	a	result	of	the	fire	sale	of	their	foreign	assets.	However,	most	
of	those	transactions	are	treated	as	trade	secrets.	
The	sanctions	also	hit	the	assets	of	Yuri Kovalchuk,	who	was	in-
cluded	in	the	US	sanctions	lists	in	March	2014,	and	the	EU	lists	in	
July	2014.	The	sanctions	imposed	on	Rossiya	Bank,	in	which	Ko-
valchuk	is	the	largest	shareholder	(37.5%),	were	particularly	pain-
ful	for	him.	The	bank’s	other	shareholders	were	also	hit	by	the	US	
sanctions,	including	Gennady	Timchenko	(who	held	a	9.8%	stake	
via	the	Transoil	company)	and	Nikolai	Shamalov	(9.6%).
As	a	result	of	the	sanctions,	Rossiya	Bank	was	cut	off	from	its	ac-
counts	with	US	banks.	The	Wall	Street	Journal	estimated	in	March	
2015	that	American	financial	institutions	had	frozen	assets	of	the	
bank	worth	nearly	US$600	million.	Bank	Rossiya	also	ceased	to	
be	 serviced	by	 the	 international	Visa	 and	MasterCard	payment	
systems.	Moreover,	between	March	and	May	2014	the	volume	of	
deposits	of	individual	customers	fell	by	nearly	30%	(to	27	billion	
roubles,	i.e.	around	US$0.7	billion),	while	the	deposits	of	legal	per-
sons	decreased	by	13%	(to	around	300	billion	roubles,	i.e.	around	
US$9	billion).26	
Initially	Kovalchuk’s	media	businesses	were	also	hit	by	the	sanc-
tions.	The	operations	of	his	Cypriot	company	Telcrest	were	blocked.	
25	 For	more	information,	see	Dutch companies investigated for supplying equipment 
for Russian bridge,	Dutch	News.nl, https://www.dutchnews.nl/news/2017/09/
dutch-companies-investigated-for-supplying-equipment-for-crimean-
bridge/
26	 Banki.ru	2018,	op.cit.	
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Via	Telcrest	(controlled	by	shareholders	of	Rossiya	Bank	and	its	
associated	companies:	ABR	Management,	founded	in	2011	by	the	
bank’s	managers	to	manage	its	assets,	and	the	Abros	investment	
company)	Kovalchuk	owned	a	25.3%	stake	in	the	CTC	Media	hold-
ing	registered	 in	 the	United	States.	As	a	result	of	 the	sanctions,	
Kovalchuk’s	 representatives	 on	 CTC	Media’s	 board	 of	 directors	
lost	their	voting	rights,	and	their	dividends	started	to	be	depos-
ited	in	blocked	accounts	in	US	banks.	
It	is	difficult	to	estimate	the	volume	of	losses	suffered	by	the	Rus-
sian	 oligarchs	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	Western	 sanctions,	 as	much	 of	
the	data	is	not	public;	moreover,	the	impact	of	the	sanctions	has	
been	compounded	by	the	economic	crisis	in	Russia,	which	also	af-
fected	the	oligarchs.	However,	based	on	the	Forbes	rankings,	the	
cumulative	effects	of	the	sanctions	and	the	economic	slump	have	
considerably	dented	the	wealth	of	the	entrepreneurs	in	question.	
According	 to	Forbes,	between	February	2014	and	April	2015	 the	
value	of	Timchenko’s	assets	decreased	by	30%	to	US$10.7	billion,	
the	wealth	of	the	Rotenbergs	shrunk	by	50%	to	US$2.85	billion,	
and	Kovalchuk’s	 assets	decreased	by	more	 than	50%	 to	US$650	
million	(see	Figure	1	on	page	15).
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ii. thE oligarchs’ stratEgiEs 
to countEract thE sanctions
The	 Russian	 oligarchs	 have	 largely	 managed	 to	 minimise	 the	
damage	and	protect	 their	 assets	 from	 the	 impact	 of	 sanctions.	
They	 have	 done	 so	 by	 using	 various	 financial	 mechanisms	 to	
prevent	the	freezing	of	assets,	which	has	allowed	them	to	con-
tinue	 doing	 business.	The	mechanisms	 they	 used	 have	 proven	
quite	effective,	because	most	of	the	assets	of	the	entrepreneurs	
in	 question	 were	 held	 in	 Europe,	 whose	 sanctions	 policy	 has	
been	much	less	strict	than	that	of	the	United	States.	Because	the	
EU	sanctions	did	not	cover	Timchenko	or	Boris,	Roman	and	Igor	
Rotenberg,	they	could	continue	doing	business	in	the	European	
market.	For	those	entrepreneurs	who	were	covered	by	sanctions,	
their	main	strategy	has	been	to	scale	down	their	stake	in	West-
ern	assets	 to	below	50%,	or	 severe	 their	 formal	 ties	with	 such	
assets	altogether	by	selling	them	to	business	partners,	relatives,	
trusted	managers	or	Russian	 state-owned	companies.	Another	
important	strategy	was	 to	remove	capital	 from	under	Western	
jurisdictions	and	repatriate	it	to	Russia.	As	a	result	of	those	ef-
forts,	most	of	 the	 foreign	assets	owned	by	Timchenko	and	 the	
Rotenbergs	changed	owners	and	avoided	freezing,	or	saw	the	re-
strictions	lifted	relatively	quickly.
Reacting	to	the	steps	taken	by	the	Russian	businessmen,	the	West	
has	 tried	 to	 tighten	 and	 extend	 the	 sanctions	 lists.	 As	 a	 result,	
over	the	last	four	years	sanctions	have	been	extended	to	the	sons	
of	 the	Rotenberg	brothers,	 i.e.	Roman	and	 Igor,	 as	well	 as	 their	
business	partners	Kai	Paananen,	Petr	Kolbin	and	Sven	Olsson,	as	
well	as	many	companies	associated	with	Timchenko	or	the	Roten-
bergs.	However,	because	of	the	high	dynamics	and	opacity	of	the	
transactions,	tracing	business	ties	has	been	very	difficult,	which	
has	effectively	allowed	 the	 sanctioned	businessmen	 to	 continue	
doing	business,	both	domestically	and	abroad	(for	more	informa-
tion,	see	the	case	studies	below).
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19 March 2014
Gunvor
Gunvor
Roman
Rotenberg
• Arena Event Oy (49.5%)
• Rossiya Bank (10%)
• Sibur (15%) 
• Stroytransgaz,
construction company (63%)
• Stroytransneftgaz (around 50%)
• Yuzhnye Zemli,
fruit producer (35%) 
• Novatek,
gas holding (23%)
• Colmar, coal extraction
company (30%)
• Aquanika,
beverage manufacturer (100%)
• Sakhatrans,
transport company (89%) 
• Alma, agri-food business
– apple producer (40%)
• Transoil,
rail cargo company (80%)
• Sovag, insurance
company (24.8%)- Hartwall Arena Helsinki (100%)
- Jokerit Hockey Club (49%)
Ksenia Frank (daughter)
IPP Oil Products
AirFix
Aviation Oy
Rorvik Timber
Arena Events Oy
Sogaz
Ust-Luga Oil Andrei Bokarev
Andrei BokarevColmar
Nevskaya
Truboprovodnaya
Kompania
Gazprombank
subsidiary
Tradescan
December 2015 Volga Group removed from
registers in tax havens and registered in Russia
Volga Group currently manages
all of Timchenko’s assets
GENNADY TIMCHENKO’S ASSETS
(VOLGA GROUP)
19 March 2014
19 March 2014
April 2014
April 2014
50% of shares
50% of shares
0.5% of shares
43.59% of shares
Torbjörn
Törnqvist
Petr
Kolbin
Kai
Paananen
12.5% of shares
Gunvor divests from assets in Russia
74% of shares
30% of shares
50% of shares
Foreign assets sold by Timchenko
shortly before the imposition of US sanctions
Foreign assets held by Timchenko
Russian assets held by TimchenkoRussian assets sold by Timchenko
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Gunvor
Gunvor
Roman
Rotenberg
• Arena Event Oy (49.5%)
• Rossiya Bank (10%)
• Sibur (15%) 
• Stroytransgaz,
construction company (63%)
• Stroytransneftgaz (around 50%)
• Yuzhnye Zemli,
fruit producer (35%) 
• Novatek,
gas holding (23%)
• Colmar, coal extraction
company (30%)
• Aquanika,
beverage manufacturer (100%)
• Sakhatrans,
transport company (89%) 
• Alma, agri-food business
– apple producer (40%)
• Transoil,
rail cargo company (80%)
• Sovag, insurance
company (24.8%)- Hartwall Arena Helsinki (100%)
- Jokerit Hockey Club (49%)
Ksenia Frank (daughter)
IPP Oil Products
AirFix
Aviation Oy
Rorvik Timber
Arena Events Oy
Sogaz
Ust-Luga Oil Andrei Bokarev
Andrei BokarevColmar
Nevskaya
Truboprovodnaya
Kompania
Gazprombank
subsidiary
Tradescan
December 2015 Volga Group removed from
registers in tax havens and registered in Russia
Volga Group currently manages
all of Timchenko’s assets
GENNADY TIMCHENKO’S ASSETS
(VOLGA GROUP)
19 March 2014
19 March 2014
April 2014
April 2014
50% of shares
50% of shares
0.5% of shares
43.59% of shares
Torbjörn
Törnqvist
Petr
Kolbin
Kai
Paananen
12.5% of shares
Gunvor divests from assets in Russia
74% of shares
30% of shares
50% of shares
Foreign assets sold by Timchenko
shortly before the imposition of US sanctions
Foreign assets held by Timchenko
Russian assets held by TimchenkoRussian assets sold by Timchenko
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Case study: Timchenko separates his Russian and foreign 
assets
On	hearing	about	the	possibility	of	sanctions	against	Russia,	
Timchenko	started	selling	his	foreign	assets	to	business	part-
ners.	Shortly	before	he	was	put	on	the	US	sanctions	list,	Tim-
chenko	sold	his	stake	in	the	Swiss	oil	trade	company	Gunvor	to	
the	Swedish	billionaire	Torbjörn	Törnqvist.27	He	also	divested	
from	companies	co-operating	with	Gunvor,	including	the	Cyp-
riot	oil	company	IPP	Oil	Products,28	which	was	most	probably	
acquired	 by	 the	Russian	 billionaire	 Petr	Kolbin.	 Timchenko	
also	reduced	his	stake	in	Arena	Events	Oy	(the	owner	of	the	
Hartwall	Arena	 stadium	 in	Helsinki	 and	 the	 Jokerit	 hockey	
club)	to	below	50%	by	selling	0.5%	to	Roman	Rotenberg	(son	of	
Boris).	However,	most	of	those	transactions	(with	the	excep-
tion	of	the	transactions	involving	Gunvor)	were	identified	by	
the	US	government	as	 attempts	 at	 circumventing	 sanctions,	
and	 as	 a	 consequence,	 the	 companies	 and	 persons	 involved	
were	also	put	on	the	sanctions	list	in	July	2015.29	As	a	result,	
they	could	no	longer	do	business	with	US	partners	or	carry	out	
operations	on	US	territory.
27	 The	transaction	was	concluded	on	19	March	2014.	The	Swedish	billionaire	
Torbjörn	Törnqvist	had	been	a	shareholder	in	Gunvor;	after	the	deal	with	
Timchenko,	he	came	to	control	80%	of	shares	in	the	company.	Gunvor	is	one	
of	the	largest	oil	traders	in	the	world;	before	2012	it	accounted	for	nearly	
40%	of	Russian	oil	sales,	currently	it	sells	negligible	quantities	of	Russian	
oil,	focusing	instead	on	oil	from	other	sources.	
28	 The	value	of	Timchenko’s	shares	 in	Gunvor	was	estimated	at	US$	1.5	bil-
lion,	and	his	stake	in	the	Cypriot	IPP	Oil	Products	at	US$	220	million.	For	
more	information,	see	Volga Group Геннадия Тимченко 19 марта продала 
50%­ную долю в кипрской IPP Oil Products,	Интернет	газета	„Знак”,	17	April	
2014,	https://www.znak.com/2014-04-17/volga_group_gennadiya_timchen-
ko_19_marta_prodala_50__nuyu_dolyu_v_kiprskoy_ipp_oil_products
29	 For	more	information,	see	US	Department	of	State,	30	July	2017,	https://www.
treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0133.aspx;	and	22	Decem-
ber	 2015,	 https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
jl0314.aspx
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  1
0/
20
18
27
At	the	same	time	Timchenko	tried	to	limit	the	influence	of	for-
eign	 entities	 on	 his	 Russian	 companies.	 In	 particular,	 he	 re-
registered	the	Volga	Group	company,	moving	it	from	tax	havens	
to	Russian	jurisdiction	and	becoming	its	direct	owner.30	Volga	
Group	subsequently	took	control	over	all	of	Timchenko’s	assets.	
Timchenko	 himself	 stepped	 up	 his	 activities	 on	 the	 Russian	
market,	entering	new	sectors	such	as	 the	agri-foods	 industry	
(especially	horticulture).	He	also	protected	some	of	his	assets	by	
transferring	ownership	of	them	to	family	members,	namely	his	
son-in-law	Gleb	Frank	and	his	daughter	Ksenia	Frank.31
In	 parallel	 to	 Timchenko’s	 actions	 refocusing	 his	 business	
on	 the	Russian	market,	Gunvor	 took	 steps	 to	 severe	 ties	not	
only	with	Timchenko	but	also	with	Russia	 in	order	 to	avoid	
being	exposed	 to	 the	US	sanctions.	The	Swiss	oil	 trader	sold	
its	 shares	 in	 Russian	 companies	 to	 Gazprombank32	 and	 the	
billionaire	Andrei	 Bokarev,	who	has	 long	 been	Timchenko’s	
business	partner33	and	is	currently	co-operating	closely	with	
Igor	Sechin,	the	CEO	of	the	state-owned	Rosneft.34
30	 Before,	shares	in	Volga	Group	had	belonged	to	the	Cypriot	company	Volga	Re-
sources	Ltd.	and	the	Luxembourg-based	VRN	Sarl.	Timchenko	owns	99.9%	of	the	
shares	in	Volga	Group;	the	remaining	0.1%	is	controlled	by	Volga	Group	Holding.
31	 For	more	 information,	 see	 Р.	Шлейнов,	 ‘Акции	СОГАЗа	достались	 дочке’,	
Но вая газета,	 10	 November	 2016,	 https://www.novayagazeta.ru/artic-
les/2016/11/10/70486-aktsii-sogaza-dostalis-dochke
32	 The	Cypriot	company	Tradescan	Consultants	Ltd.,	which	is	owned	by	Gazprom-
bank,	purchased	50%	of	the	shares	in	Nevskaya	Truboprovodnaya	Kompania	
(which	co-owns	the	oil	terminal	in	Ust-Luga)	from	Gunvor,	thus	increasing	
its	stake	in	that	company	to	74%;	the	remaining	26%	is	controlled	by	the	state-
owned	Transneft.	The	terminal	mostly	handles	oil	for	the	state-owned	Rosneft.
33	 In	2012,	Bokaryov	and	his	business	partner	Iskander	Makhmudov	acquired	13%	
of	the	shares	in	the	transport	company	Transoil,	in	which	Volga	Resources	owns	
the	remaining	80%.	For	more	information,	see	А.	Темкин,	‘Берег	олигархов:	
как	 «Усть-Луга	 Ойл»	 за	 3	 года	 увеличила	 выручку	 вчетверо’,	 РБК,	
7	December	2015,	http://www.rbc.ru/ins/business/07/12/2015/565f4f6e9a7
947084d937c79
34	 For	more	information,	see	А.	Горшкова,	Ольга речной сборки, ЦУРреализм,	
Medium,	17	March	2017, 	https://medium.com/@tzurrealism/knyagini-olgi-
eafa34fc4cfc
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As	 he	 put	 his	 assets	 under	 Russian	 jurisdiction,	 Gennady	
Timchenko	and	his	wife	also	moved	to	Russia	and	stopped	us-
ing	their	foreign	properties.35	Since	2014,	Timchenko	has	os-
tentatiously	 remained	 in	Russia.	Most	 of	 these	 actions	have	
been	preventative	 in	nature;	Timchenko	was	not	put	on	 the	
EU	 sanctions	 list,	 and	 is	 able	 to	 continue	 doing	 business	 in	
Europe.	His	 decisions	were	 probably	motivated	 by	 concerns	
about	his	security	 in	 the	West	and	the	possibility	of	 further	
sanctions.	Presumably,	it	was	also	a	gesture	towards	President	
Putin	and	the	rest	of	 the	Russian	elite	 (especially	Rotenberg	
and	Kovalchuk),	and	an	element	of	political	manoeuvring	to	
preserve	Timchenko’s	position	within	 that	 elite.	Moving	as-
sets	to	Russia	was	an	important	gesture	to	the	president,	who	
had	called	on	Russian	oligarchs	to	stop	using	tax	havens	and	
concentrate	their	assets	under	Russian	jurisdiction.	The	sanc-
tions	imposed	on	Russian	officials	and	businessmen,	in	addi-
tion	to	creating	real	problems	for	the	persons	affected,	para-
doxically	also	tightened	their	relationships	with	the	president	
who	was	responsible	for	the	sanctions	in	the	first	place,	as	they	
were	imposed	on	Russia	in	the	aftermath	of	his	decisions.	They	
deepened	the	co-dependence	of	the	president	and	his	 ‘court’.	
Timchenko’s	ostentatious	cutting	of	his	ties	with	the	West	and	
his	demonstration	of	loyalty	to	the	president	was	therefore	an	
important	step,	intended	to	highlight	his	place	within	the	Pu-
tinist	elite.	(For	more	information	about	the	transactions,	see	
Diagram	on	page	24	and	25).
35	 The	Russian	media	reported	that	he	owned	villas	in	Geneva	and	Cote	d’Azur,	
an	apartment	in	Paris	and	two	hotels	in	France.	For	more	information,	see	
‘Дома	и	отели	супругов	Тимченко’,	Ведомости,	21	January	2013,	https://
www.vedomosti.ru/politics/gallery/2013/01/21/timchenko_real_estate#/
galleries/140737489132611/normal/2	 and	 Alexey	 Navalny’s	 investigative	
piece	of	6	August	2014,	Где бывала эта сука,	https://navalny.com/p/3717/
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ASSETS OF THE ROTENBERG BROTHERS
– EVERYTHING STAYS WITHIN THE FAMILY
Stroygazmontazh 
July 2014 the company
was removed from
registers in Cyprus
and registered in Russia
December 2014 Arkady bought 17%
of shares in Stroygazmontazh from Boris
and since then controls 100% of the company
SMP Bank Latvia
owned by
the Rotenberg
brothers’ SMP Bank Russia 
In May 2014, SMP Bank Latvia
was sold to its managers
and renamed
as Meridian Trade Bank
*April 2014 0.5% stake in Arena Event Oy was sold by Gennady Timchenko to Boris Rotenberg
Volgogradneftemash
2016 Boris bought
79.1% of shares
in Volgogradneftemash
from Arkady
Långvik Capital Ltd
owned jointly by
the Rotenberg
brothers (50/50);
it controls:
– the Långvik conference centre
and hotel near Helsinki (100%)
– the Tanskarlan Centrum developer (100%)
– Arena Event Oy (50%)*
[owner of the Hartwall Arena Helsinki
and 49% of shares in the Jokerit Hockey Club (KHL)]
October 2015 Roman Rotenberg,
son of Boris, took over 100%
of shares in Långvik Capital Ltd
Arkady Rotenberg Boris Rotenberg
ABROAD
RUSSIA
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Case study: A new generation of the Rotenbergs joins 
the	business
Like	Timchenko,	the	Rotenberg	brothers	also	decided	to	divest	
from	some	of	their	foreign	assets,	 in	order	to	 limit	their	ties	
with	 the	West	and	allow	the	businesses	 they	sold	 to	operate	
freely	 in	 Europe.	An	 important	 part	 of	 that	 strategy	was	 to	
transfer	ownership	of	some	assets	to	their	sons.
The	brothers	got	rid	of	the	Latvian	branch	of	the	SMP	Bank,	
which	was	taken	over	by	its	managers.36	The	bank	further	dis-
tanced	itself	from	its	Russian	founders	by	changing	its	name	
to	Meridian	Trade	Bank.	Moreover,	the	Finnish	assets	of	the	
Rotenberg	brothers	were	taken	over	by	Roman	Rotenberg	(son	
of	Boris),	who	 is	 a	Finnish	and	British	national.	Roman	also	
became	the	formal	owner	of	his	father’s	residence	on	the	out-
skirts	of	Riga.37	However,	the	US	administration	treated	those	
transactions	as	purely	formal	and	aimed	at	circumventing	the	
sanctions.	As	a	result,	in	July	2015	Roman	Rotenberg	was	also	
put	on	the	US	sanctions	 list,	which	blocked	his	co-operation	
with	US	companies,	although	he	is	still	free	to	operate	on	the	
European	market.
The	 Russian	 media	 has	 also	 demonstrated	 that	 despite	 the	
sanctions	(imposed	by	both	the	EU	and	the	US	in	the	case	of	
Arkady),	the	Rotenberg	brothers	have	found	a	way	to	contin-
ue	 doing	 business	 abroad	 with	 trusted	 long-time	 managers	
of	SMP	Bank	acting	on	their	behalf.	The	authors	of	the	anti-
corruption	munscanner.com	 social	 media	 portal,38	 who	 have	
36	 The	bank’s	customers	included	Gazprom	and	around	18,000	retired	Russian	
military	personnel	who	live	in	Latvia	but	receive	Russian	pensions.	
37	 For	more	information,	see	‘Зарубежное	имущество	российских	олигархов.	
Аркадий	и	Борис	Ротенберги’,	Polit.ru,	20	February	2017,	http://polit.ru/
article/2017/02/20/property3/
38	 The	munscanner.com	 portal	was	 founded	 in	2014	with	 the	 support	 of	Bo-
ris	Nemtsov	 and	monitors	 the	 legality	 of	 actions	 by	 officials	 and	 politi-
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investigated	the	subject,	argue	that	Dmitry	Kalantyrski,	SMP	
Bank’s	CEO	until	February	2015,	who	now	lives	in	Prague,	and	
Denis	Pospelov,	who	was	the	deputy	CEO	of	SMP	Bank	until	
May	2014	and	currently	lives	in	Latvia,	own	the	assets	in	Eu-
rope	only	formally,	while	in	reality	they	operate	and	invest	on	
behalf	of	the	Rotenberg	brothers.	The	foreign	activities	of	the	
Rotenberg	family	have	also	been	corroborated	by	an	investiga-
tion	by	German	journalists	published	in	May	2018.	They	have	
produced	documents	showing	that	the	Rotenbergs,	including	
Arkady,	have	invested	around	€1	billion	in	properties	in	Ger-
many	via	shell	companies.39
The	Rotenbergs	have	also	carried	out	a	number	of	operations	
on	the	Russian	market	to	minimise	the	costs	of	doing	business	
under	sanctions.	Arkady	has	taken	over	most	of	the	companies	
affected	by	sanctions.	They	have	limited	their	activities	to	the	
Russian	market	and	to	co-operation	with	Russian	companies.	
Only	some	of	the	Rotenbergs’	assets	have	been	repatriated	to	
Russia	from	tax	havens.	Most	assets	were	shielded	from	sanc-
tions	because	they	had	been	taken	over	by	Igor	Rotenberg,	son	
of	Arkady,	who	was	only	put	under	US	sanctions	in	April	2018.	
When	Igor	too	was	put	on	the	sanctions	list,	his	sister	Liliana	
became	 a	 shareholder	 in	 the	 family	 businesses.	(For	 more	
information	 about	 the	 transactions,	 see	 Diagrams	 on	 pages	
29	and	32).
cians	 in	 Russia.	 For	 more	 information,	 see	 Аркадий Ротенберг: Кипр 
наш!,	11	April	2017,	https://munscanner.com/2017/04/kinasis-llc/	and	Как 
Аркāдийс Ротенбергс от санкций уходил’,	12	May	2017,	http://munscanner.
com/2017/05/arkadijs-rotenbergs/
39	 For	more	information,	see	G.	Keller,	K.	Schlieter,	‘Der	Kudamm-Komplex’, 
Berliner Zeitung,	 16	May	2018,	https://story.berliner-zeitung.de/category/
kudammkomplex/
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ARKADY ROTENBERG’S CHILDREN
JOIN THE BUSINESS
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April 2014
78.7% TEK Mosenergo
2015 
Igor sold shares
in Mostotrest
to TFK Finance
April 2018
Arkady Rotenberg acquired
TFK Finance
and took control
over 94.2% of Mostotrest
March 2018 (shortly before Igor
has been put under US sanctions)
shares taken over by Igor’s sister
Lilia Rotenberg
December 2017
Gazprom bureniye removed from
registers in Cyprus and Saint Lucia,
and registered in Russia
October 2014
30% Mostotrest
October 2014
33.3% in TPS Real Estate
October 2014
78.7% in Gazprom bureniye
(the remaining 16.3% owned
by Boris Rotenberg)
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Igor Rotenberg, son of Arkady
ASSETS TAKEN OVER FROM HIS FATHER
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Case study: Yuri Kovalchuk develops business in Russia
Bank	Rossiya,	which	Kovalchuk	controls,	announced	immedi-
ately	after	its	head	was	put	on	the	sanctions	list	that	it	would	
restrict	its	activities	to	the	territory	of	Russia	and	minimise	its	
relations	with	foreign	partners.	Kovalchuk	also	tried	to	pre-
vent	sanctions	 from	being	 imposed	on	businesses	controlled	
by	the	bank,	such	as	Sogaz.40	To	this	end,	he	initially	reduced	
the	stakes	the	bank	held	in	those	businesses	to	less	than	50%,	
i.e.	below	the	50%	threshold	set	by	the	US	administration.	
Kovalchuk	also	managed	to	carry	out	some	successful	opera-
tions	 resulting	 in	 sanctions	being	 lifted	 from	some	assets	of	
Rossiya	Bank.	When	he	sold	the	Cypriot	Telcrest	company	to	
the	 Russian	 billionaire	 Alexey	 Mordashov	 and	 the	 Russian	
state-owned	 bank	 VTB,41	 the	 company’s	 banking	 accounts	
could	be	unblocked.	Telcrest	controlled	25.3%	of	shares	in	the	
US-based	CTC	Media	company.	
The	financial	operations	undertaken	by	Kovalchuk	and	Bank	
Rossiya	since	2014	were	also	deemed	suspicious	by	the	US	ad-
ministration,	 as	 a	 result	 of	which	 the	 sanctions	 list	was	 ex-
panded	in	2016	to	include	companies	and	persons	associated	
with	 Bank	 Rossiya	 (e.g.	 ABR	 Management	 and	 its	 director	
Kirill	 Kovalchuk	 (Yuri’s	 relative).42	 (For	 more	 information	
about	the	transactions,	see	Diagram	on	page	34).
40	 Russia’s	largest	insurance	company,	founded	in	1993	by	Gazprom.	Its	custom-
ers	include	the	largest	state-owned	companies.	Companies	associated	with	
Gazprom	currently	hold	a	majority	of	shares	in	Sogaz,	while	Kovalchuk	and	
Timchenko’s	daughter	hold	minority	stakes.
41	 For	more	information,	see	ВТБ стал косвенным владельцем 7,5% CTC Media,	
Interfax,	28	September	2015,	http://www.interfax.ru/business/469811	
42	 For	more	information,	see	US	Department	of	State,	1	September	2016,	https://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl5048.aspx;	and	20	
December	 2016,	 https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/
Pages/jl0688.aspx
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Rossiya Bank’s chief shareholders
YURI KOVALCHUK’S FINANCIAL OPERATIONS
US sanctions, March 2014
EU sanctions, July 2014
Yuri Kovalchuk (37.5%)
EU sanctions, July 2014
Nikolai Shamalov (9.6%)
Rossiya Bank sells some shares controlled by the Abros* investment company
* September 2014 Rossiya Bank transfers control of Abros to the company’s management
Telcrest (54.9%)
owns 25% in CTC Media
In September 2015 Abros sold
27.9% of shares in Telcrest
to Aleksei Mordashov
and the state-owned VTB
** Until autumn 2014, Gennady Timchenko had held a 12.5% stake in Sogaz,
    which he subsequently sold to his daughter Ksenia Frank
Sogaz – insurance company**
(51%)
 
In March 2014 Abros sold
2.5% of shares in Sogaz
In July 2014 Abros sold 16% of shares
in Sogaz to a Gazprom subsidiary
The remaining 32.5% of Sogaz shares
owned by Abros were taken over in 2016
by Akvila, a company owned
by Bolshoy Dom 9, a company
named after the registration address
of Rossiya Bank and controlled
by Yuri Kovalchuk and his wife
US sanctions, March 2014
Gennady Timchenko (9.8%)
2,5%
16,0%
32,5%
Rossiya Bank
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iii. thE KrEmlin’s suPPort for 
EntrEPrEnEurs undEr sanctions 
Irrespective	 of	 their	 personal	 damage-control	 strategies,	 the	
entrepreneurs	 from	Vladimir	 Putin’s	 inner	 circle	were	 also	 of-
fered	a	helping	hand	by	Russian	state	institutions.	It	was	a	way	of	
compensating	them	for	the	losses	suffered	by	the	oligarchs	with	
friendly	ties	to	the	president	as	a	result	of	the	sanctions	imposed	
as	 a	 consequence	of	Russia’s	 aggressive	 foreign	policy.	Enabling	
them	to	rebuild	their	wealth	was	a	way	for	the	Kremlin	not	to	lose	
their	support	for	its	costly	foreign	policy	and	retain	the	Russian	
elite’s	loyalty.	Even	if	Russian	business	did	not	officially	criticise	
Russia’s	 actions	 towards	Ukraine,	 it	was	 clear	 that	 the	 Russian	
economy	and	the	oligarchs	personally	would	bear	the	cost	of	those	
actions.	 Yet	 the	Kremlin	 chose	 to	 put	 its	 geopolitical	 objectives	
above	economic	concerns.	
The	Kremlin’s	propaganda,	which	presents	Russia	 as	 a	besieged	
fortress	and	the	West	as	the	eternal	enemy	seeking	to	destabilise	
Russia	 using	 political	 and	 economic	methods,	 has	 proven	 quite	
effective	in	convincing	the	general	public	in	Russia.	Despite	fall-
ing	incomes,	rising	prices	and	food	shortages,	the	euphoria	trig-
gered	by	the	annexation	of	Crimea	consolidated	Putin’s	power	and	
boosted	the	president’s	popularity.	Business,	however,	proved	less	
susceptible	to	the	propaganda,	especially	since	the	sanctions	were	
long-term.	Russian	companies	(especially	state-owned	enterpris-
es)	 started	 demanding	 billions	 in	 state	 aid.	 In	 order	 to	 demon-
strate	that	he	is	still	the	guarantor	of	the	Russian	elite’s	welfare,	
the	president	decided	to	compensate	them	(at	least	partly)	for	the	
losses	they	suffered	as	a	result	of	the	sanctions.	The	scale	of	that	
support	and	the	instruments	used	indirectly	show	how	dissatis-
fied	the	Russian	business	elite	was	with	the	Kremlin’s	confronta-
tional	policy	towards	the	West.
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1. Public procurement as the main instrument of support
Public	contracts	have	been	the	main	instrument	deployed	by	the	
Russian	government	to	support	the	businessmen	affected	by	the	
Western	 sanctions.	 Goods,	 services	 and	 works	 ordered	 by	 the	
state,	 local	 and	 regional	 governments	 and	 state-owned	 compa-
nies	in	2017	were	worth	a	total	of	36.5	trillion	roubles	(more	than	
US$626	 billion),	 accounting	 for	 nearly	 40%	 of	 GDP.	 Despite	 the	
crisis,	the	Russian	federal	budget	and	the	regional	budgets	tried	
to	 keep	 public	 procurement	 spending	 at	 around	 6	 trillion	 rou-
bles	(US$103	billion),	i.e.	around	6%	of	GDP	in	2017.	However,	the	
amounts	spent	by	state-owned	enterprises	were	much	higher.	Of-
ficial	(registered)	transaction	figures	show	that	while	such	com-
panies	bought	goods	and	services	worth	a	total	of	nearly	18	trillion	
roubles	(US$468	billion)	in	2014,	which	corresponded	to	around	
25%	of	Russia’s	GDP,	in	2017	that	figure	increased	to	more	than	30	
trillion	roubles	(US$515	billion),	i.e.	around	32%	of	GDP.43	Most	of	
the	 contracts,	 according	 to	 a	 report	 from	 the	Russian	Ministry	
of	Finance,	were	awarded	without	competitive	tendering	proce-
dures	(around	95%	in	2017).	The	Ministry’s	figures	also	show	that	
Rosneft	oil	company	and	 its	affiliates	were	 the	biggest	spenders	
among	the	Russian	state	companies  in	2017	 (7.8	 trillion	roubles,	
i.e.	US$134	billion).44	Gazprom	has	also	 systematically	appeared	
among	 the	 largest	 buyers	 in	 recent	 years.45	 However,	 it	 should	
be	noted	 that	 these	figures	only	 include	 transactions	registered	
43	 For	more	information,	see	Рынок	закупок	государства	и госкомпаний	
в 2017	г достиг	36,5 трлн	руб —	«РТС-тендер», Рамблер,	19	January	2018,	
https://news.rambler.ru/business/38929744-rynok-zakupok-gosudarstva-
i-goskompaniy-v-2017-g-dostig-36-5-trln-rub-rts-tender/	 and	 А.	 Пуш-
карская,	‘Госкомпании	не	сняли	маски’,	Коммерсантъ,	25	February	2016,	
https://www.ippnou.ru/article.php?idarticle=013699
44	 For	more	information,	see	the	Ministry	of	Finance	of	the	Russian	Federation,	
Мониторинг применения федерального закона от 18 июля 2011 г. № 223­фз 
«O закупках товаров, работ, услуг отдельными видами юридических лиц» 
в 2017 году,	https://www.minfin.ru/common/upload/library/2018/04/main/
Monitoring_223-FZ__2017_aktualizirovannaya_redaktsiya.pdf
45	 Cf.	А.	Пушкарская,	op. cit.	According	to	information	available	from	Gazprom,	
the	company	has	been	systematically	expanding	its	investment	programme,	
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in	the	special	electronic	system.	Access	to	information	about	the	
winners	 of	 tenders	 and	 contracts	 from	 state-owned	 companies	
in	Russia	has	been	systematically	restricted	in	recent	years.	For	
instance,	 in	November	2017	the	Russian	government	authorised	
state-owned	companies	and	the	Defence	Ministry,	the	Federal	Se-
curity	Service	and	the	Foreign	 Intelligence	Service	 to	stop	pub-
lishing	information	about	the	transactions	they	enter,	including	
information	 on	 their	 business	 partners	 (suppliers,	 contractors,	
etc.)	until	1	July	2018.46	
Arkady	 Rotenberg’s	 Stroygazmontazh	 and	 Timchenko’s	 Stroy-
transgaz	have	been	the	key	contractors	 for	Gazprom’s	 ‘Power	of	
Siberia’	gas	pipeline	to	China.	„Forbes”	magazine’s	‘Kings	of	Gov-
ernment	Procurements’	 rankings	 (see	Figure	2	on	page	39)	also	
show	 that	 companies	 linked	 to	 these	 two	men	have	been	major	
beneficiaries	 of	 public	 investments	 in	Russia.	 Forbes	 estimates,	
based	 on	 official	 published	 data,47	 indicate	 that	 the	 Rotenberg	
family,	which	was	a	major	beneficiary	of	public	procurement	even	
before	the	sanctions	were	imposed,	became	the	uncontested	lead-
er	in	2015,	winning	contracts	worth	a	total	of	670	billion	roubles	
(nearly	US$11	billion).	Companies	owned	by	the	Rotenbergs	won	
contracts	 from	Gazprom,	Russian	Railways,	 the	City	of	Moscow	
and	 the	 Road	 Construction	 Agency.	 Stroygazmontazh	 has	 been	
which	in	2017	was	worth	1.2	trillion	roubles,	i.e.	over	200	billion	roubles	more	
than	the	year	before.
46	 That	decision	was	related	to	the	US	sanctions	and	the	difficulties	faced	by	
Russian	state-owned	companies,	especially	in	the	defence	sector,	in	finding	
buyers.	Classifying	the	list	of	beneficiaries	was	a	way	to	circumvent	the	US	
sanctions.
47	 Forbes	looks	into	transactions	above	1	billion	roubles	(around	US$16	million).	
Its	journalists	note	that	compiling	the	ranking	becomes	more	difficult	every	
year	as	information	about	the	real	beneficiaries	is	withheld.	Moreover,	Forbes	
notes	that	state-owned	companies	have	increasingly	been	awarding	contracts	
to	companies	that	are	too	small	to	deliver	on	their	commitments,	which	means	
that	they	are	most	probably	acting	as	intermediaries.	However,	Forbes	does	
not	indicate	for	whom	they	may	be	working.	The	2017	ranking	was	topped	by	
the	owners	of	the	Peton	company	from	Ufa,	whose	portfolio	of	contracts	in	
2016	was	worth	176	billion	roubles	(around	US$2.6	billion),	having	grown	from	
a	mere	1.9	billion	roubles	(around	US$31	million)	the	year	before.	
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implementing	 the	 Kremlin’s	 priority	 project,	 building	 a	 bridge	
connecting	Russia	with	Crimea	(its	value	has	been	estimated	at	
230	billion	roubles,	i.e.	around	US$3.5	billion),	and	constructing	
a	gas	pipeline	connecting	Krasnodar	krai	with	Crimea	(20	billion	
roubles,	 i.e.	 around	US$300	million).	 Reports	 that	 entities	 con-
trolled	by	Gennady	Timchenko	and	Arkady	Rotenberg	were	the	
biggest	 beneficiaries	 of	 infrastructure	 projects	 implemented	 by	
Gazprom	and	Rosneft	were	also	included	in	a	non-public	analytic	
report	on	the	oil	and	gas	sector	prepared	by	the	state-owned	Sber-
bank.	The	bank’s	CEO	Herman	Gref	was	then	forced	to	personally	
apologise	to	the	COEs	of	the	companies	covered	in	the	report	(in-
cluding	Timchenko	and	Gazprom	CEO	Alexey	Miller)	and	fire	the	
analysts	who	drafted	the	documents.	 Interestingly,	Gref	did	not	
call	into	question	the	report’s	findings,	but	only	accused	the	ana-
lysts	of	a	lack	of	professionalism	and	using	uncorroborated	data.48	
The	Rotenberg	family	also	benefited	from	the	Platon	system	that	
collects	toll	from	trucks	weighing	over	12	tonnes	on	federal	roads,	
which	was	implemented	in	November	2015	despite	massive	pro-
tests	by	truck	drivers.	The	company	RT-Invest	Transportniye	Sis-
temy	controlled	by	Igor	Rotenberg	(50%)	was	selected	without	ten-
der	to	operate	the	system	for	13	years.	The	cost	of	developing	and	
implementing	the	system	has	been	estimated	at	30	billion	roubles	
(around	US$500	million).	The	operator’s	annual	fee	is	10.6	billion	
roubles	 (i.e.	 over	US$170	million	 in	 2017).	 By	mid-June	2017,	 i.e.	
within	20	months	of	its	launch,	the	system	had	collected	around	
29	billion	roubles	(around	US$450	million),	which	was	deposited	
with	the	road	fund	that	finances	the	repairs	of	federal	roads.	
48	 Sberbank’s	critical	report	on	Rosneft	was	written	in	October	2017,	and	the	
report	on	Gazprom	in	May	2018.	For	more	information,	see	А.	Хачатуров,	
‘Газпром	сильно	проигрывает,	а	с	ним	Россия’,	Новая газета,	24	May	
2018,	https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2018/05/24/76579-gazprom-
silno-proigryvaet-a-s-nim-rossiya
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Figure 2. ‘Kings of Government Procurements’
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source: Forbes 2018
2. Additional financing for infrastructure projects under 
sanctions
The	state	has	also	tried	to	financially	support	infrastructure	pro-
jects	which	have	been	experiencing	difficulties	as	a	consequence	
of	 the	 international	 sanctions.	 However,	 that	 instrument	 has	
been	used	more	 sparingly:	 the	original	 scale	of	 requests	 for	aid	
made	in	the	autumn	of	2014	was	massive,	with	state-owned	en-
tities	such	as	Rosneft	and	the	state-owned	banks	accounting	for	
most	of	it,	and	exceeded	the	capacity	of	the	National	Welfare	Fund	
(which	was	worth	3	trillion	roubles,	i.e.	around	US$70	billion	in	
late	2014).	However,	President	Putin	did	not	allow	any	massive	de-
ployment	of	reserves,	and	took	direct	control	over	 the	decision-
making	 process	 regarding	 co-financing	 for	 projects	 from	 the	
govern	ment	in	early	2015.	As	a	consequence,	Fund	resources	were	
mainly	channelled	to	state-owned	entities,	such	as	the	banks	or	
the	Russian	Fund	for	Direct	Investments.	However,	state	aid	was	
also	awarded	to	the	Yamal	LNG	project	implemented	by	Novatek	
(owned	by	Timchenko	and	others),	which	received	150	billion	rou-
bles	(US$2.5	billion)	from	the	Fund	in	2015.	State	aid	to	the	amount	
of	1.5	billion	roubles	(around	US$25	million)	was	awarded	in	2016	
to	the	Sakhatrans	transport	company,	in	which	Timchenko	holds	
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a	89%	stake,	and	which	had	been	cut	off	from	Western	sources	of	
financing	 and	 faced	 problems	with	 building	 the	 coal	 reloading	
terminal	at	the	port	of	Vanino	in	Yakutia.
3. Support for banks under sanctions 
In	addition	to	government	procurements,	public	institutions	also	
became	heavily	involved	in	supporting	the	Russian	banking	sys-
tem,	especially	the	private	banks	that	were	put	under	sanctions,	
namely	the	Rotenbergs’	SMP	Bank	and	Rossiya	Bank	controlled	by	
Kovalchuk	and	Timchenko.	The	central	bank	initially	supported	
the	two	banks	very	energetically	with	cash	during	the	bank	run	
in	March	2014.	In	May	the	same	year	it	handed	over	three	banks	
facing	bankruptcy	(including	Mosoblbank)	to	SMP	Bank,	which	
was	tasked	with	improving	their	financial	standing	and	received	
a	ten-year	loan	of	117	billion	roubles	(US$3.4	billion)	at	an	interest	
rate	of	0.51%	 for	 that	purpose.49	This	not	only	 significantly	 sup-
ported	SMP	Bank	financially,	but	also	enabled	it	to	use	the	card	
payment	system	of	Mosoblbank	(which	was	not	under	sanctions)	
to	provide	services	to	its	own	customers,	and	to	use	the	Visa	and	
MasterCard	systems	despite	the	blockade.50	Finally,	in	April	2015	
the	Central	Bank	of	Russia	softened	certain	requirements	appli-
cable	 to	 Bank	 Rossiya	 and	 SMP	 Bank,	 including	 requirements	
concerning	ratings,	so	that	Russian	pension	funds	could	deposit	
their	monies	with	the	banks.51
49	 For	more	 information,	see	А.	Вержбицкий,	 ‘Плата	за	дружбу:	как	банк	
Ротенбергов	переживает	санкци’,	Forbes,	13	April	2015, http://www.forbes.
ru/finansy/igroki/285505-plata-za-druzhbu-kak-bank-rotenbergov-perezhi-
vaet-sanktsii
50	 For	more	information,	see	В.	Лебедева,	‘СМП	Банк	получил	16	млрд	рублей	
прибыли	 благодаря	 санации	 Мособлбанка	 и	 торговле	 бумагами’, 
dp.ru,	1	September	2015,	https://www.dp.ru/a/2015/09/01/SMP_bank_po-
luchil_16_mlrd/
51	 Cf.	Decision	of	the	Central	Bank	of	Russia,	23	April	2015,	http://www.cbr.ru/
press/PR/?file=23042015_151314sbrfr2015-04-23T15_08_08.htm.	For	more	
information,	 see	ЦБ облегчил доступ к пенсионным деньгам для банков, 
находящихся под санкциями Запада,	banki.ru,	24	April	2015, http://www.
banki.ru/news/lenta/?id=7949942
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According	to	Russian	media	reports,	the	state	administration	has	
also	supported	Rossiya	Bank	and	SMP	Bank	by	issuing	an	infor-
mal	 recommendation	 to	 state-owned	 enterprises	 to	move	 their	
financial	accounts	to	the	two	banks.	As	a	result,	in	the	following	
months	 companies	 such	 as	 RusGidro	 and	 Rosseti	 became	 their	
customers.	Moreover,	SMP	Bank	considerably	expanded	its	port-
folio	of	loans	to	regional	administrations:	in	2014	it	won	400	loan	
competitions	announced	by	the	regional	governments	for	a	total	
amount	of	12.5	billion	roubles,	i.e.	over	US$320	million	(the	year	
before	it	had	won	292	tenders	worth	a	total	of	4.5	billion	roubles,	
i.e.	around	US$141	million).	Importantly,	the	Russian	government	
approved	 a	 modification	 of	 the	 tender	 conditions	 under	 which	
the	banks’	original	pre-sanction	ratings	had	been	taken	into	ac-
count	 (as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 sanctions,	 the	 bank	 had	 their	 ratings	
withdrawn).	As	a	result,	SMP	Bank	expanded	its	loan	portfolio	by	
20	billion	roubles	(around	US$500	million)	 in	2014.52	Finally,	 in	
March	2014,	President	Vladimir	Putin	ostentatiously	opened	an	
account	with	Rossiya	Bank	into	which	his	salary	is	paid.
In	addition,	despite	the	general	tendency	to	impose	stricter	con-
ditions	 on	 access	 to	 operations	 involving	 public	 funds	 for	 Rus-
sian	banks,	the	government	decided	to	grant	access	to	SMP	Bank	
and	Bank	Rossiya	to	conduct	such	operations.	Ordinances	signed	
by	Prime	Minister	Medvedev	on	28	October	2017	authorised	the	
monies	 contributed	 to	 the	 fund	 of	 obligatory	 insurance	 against	
industrial	accidents	and	vocational	diseases	to	be	deposited	with	
Bank	Rossiya	and	SMP	Bank;	moreover,	Bank	Rossiya	was	also	al-
lowed	to	accept	deposits	from	the	federal	budget,	and	SMP	Bank	to	
receive	spare	cash	from	the	state-owned	enterprises.53	
52	 For	more	information,	see	А.	Вержбицкий,	‘Импортозамещение’,	Forbes,	
3	April	2015,	http://www.forbes.ru/forbes/issue/2015-04/283043-importo-
zameshchenie
53	 Cf.	Ordinance	of	the	Government	of	the	Russian	Federation,	27	November	
2017,	http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201710310025.	
For	more	information,	see	Т.	Воронова,	С.	Бочарова,	‘Банки	Ковальчука	
и	Ротенбергов	допущены	до	государственных	денег’,	Ведомости,	1	No-
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Another	important	form	of	support	for	the	Russian	banking	sec-
tor,	and	especially	the	banks	under	sanctions,	was	offered	by	the	
Central	Bank	of	Russia,	which	created	a	national	payment	 card	
system.	This	was	established	in	2014	to	handle	all	card	transac-
tions	 in	 Russia,	 including	 transactions	 involving	 international	
Visa	and	MasterCard	cards	(which	the	system	started	to	service	
in	mid-2015).	Thanks	to	this,	those	Russian	banks	that	had	been	
disconnected	from	the	international	systems	(Rossiya	Bank,	SMP	
Bank	and	the	banks	operating	 in	Crimea)	could	continue	to	use	
foreign-issued	 cards	 in	 internal	 Russian	 transactions.	 Moreo-
ver	 the	 national	 system	 issued	 a	 Russian	 payment	 card,	MIR.54	
Thanks	to	its	agreements	with	the	large	global	payment	systems	
such	as	MasterCard	and	JCB,	which	permit	the	issuance	of	dual	
brand	cards,	MIR	functions	both	in	Russia	and	abroad.	As	a	result,	
the	card	became	particularly	popular	 in	Crimea	(where	Rossiya	
Bank	is	one	of	the	market	leaders).55
4. Compensatory tax breaks for oligarchs
For	 those	 entrepreneurs	 from	 the	 president’s	 inner	 circle	 who	
faced	individual	sanctions	and	restrictions	on	travel,	it	was	par-
ticularly	important	to	be	exempted	from	taxes	in	Russia.	The	law	
to	 that	 effect,	 dubbed	 the	 ‘Timchenko	 law’	 by	 the	 media,	 was	
enacted	in	a	fast-track	procedure	in	April	2017.56	Under	the	new	
vember	2017, https://www.vedomosti.ru/finance/articles/2017/11/01/740158-
banki-druzei	
54	 More	than	30	million	MIR	cards	were	issued	before	the	end	of	2017;	they	are	
available	from	around	150	Russian	banks.
55	 Rossiya	Bank	was	one	of	the	few	Russian	financial	institutions	to	become	
involved	in	providing	financial	services	for	Crimea,	which	were	of	crucial	
importance	for	the	Kremlin,	including	services	for	the	Black	Sea	Fleet	troops	
stationed	there;	it	also	acquired	shares	in	the	Simferopol	airport	and	contrib-
uted	to	its	expansion.	The	state-owned	banks	in	Russia	decided	not	to	involve	
themselves	in	Crimea,	fearing	further	Western	sanctions.
56	 Provisions	on	tax	breaks	for	oligarchs	under	sanctions	were	added	to	the	
governmental	draft	bill	‘On	amending	Chapter	23	of	the	Tax	Code	of	the	Rus-
sian	Federation’	(which	initially	did	not	concern	that	subject	matter	at	all)	in	
mid-March	2017	at	the	second	reading.	The	amendments	tabled	by	the	depu-
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rules,	a	natural	person	upon	whom	third-country	sanctions	had	
been	imposed	and	who	was	forced	to	stay	in	Russia	for	at	least	183	
days	a	year	(the	number	of	days	spent	in	Russia	which	normally	
entails	a	legal	obligation	to	pay	taxes	in	the	Russian	Federation)	
could	avoid	paying	taxes	in	Russia	if	they	could	demonstrate	that	
their	tax	domicile	was	in	another	country.	To	demonstrate	this,	
the	persons	concerned	only	needed	to	present	documents	proving	
they	were	registered	as	taxpayers	in	a	third	country,	without	hav-
ing	 to	 show	that	 they	actually	paid	any	 taxes,	which	 facilitated	
abuse	and	effectively	enabled	the	beneficiaries	of	the	 law	not	to	
pay	any	 taxes	at	all.	The	 law	came	 into	 force	retroactively,	ena-
bling	the	beneficiaries	to	claim	back	taxes	paid	since	2014.	When	
introducing	the	new	rules,	the	Russian	government	did	not	pre-
sent	any	calculations	of	the	likely	cost	to	the	state	budget,	and	re-
fused	to	disclose	who	benefited	from	the	bill.
5. Indirect support mechanisms
The	 National	 Media	 Group	 (NMG)	 holding,	 controlled	 by	 Koval-
chuk	via	Rossiya	Bank57,	became	one	of	the	main	beneficiaries	of	
new	 regulations	 concerning	 the	Russian	media	 sector,	 including	
the	2014	bill	which	required	foreign	investors	to	scale	down	their	
stakes	 in	media	 companies	 in	Russia	 to	 20%.	NMG	exploited	 the	
situation	 of	 the	 foreign	 investors	who	 had	 been	 forced	 to	 divest	
ties	radically	changed	the	meaning	of	the	governmental	draft,	including	its	
main	assumption	that	the	new	law	would	not	create	any	costs	for	the	state	
budget.	
57	 The	National	Media	Group	was	created	in	2008	as	a	result	of	a	merger	be-
tween	the	media	assets	held	by	Rossiya	Bank,	Sogaz,	the	oil	company	Surgut-
neftegaz	and	the	tycoon	Alexey	Mordashov.	Its	current	ownership	structure	
is	unclear.	The	NMG	Board	of	Directors	is	chaired	by	Alina	Kabayeva,	whom	
the	Russian	media	regard	as	Vladimir	Putin’s	partner,	while	Kirill	Koval-
chuk,	a	relative	of	Yuri	Kovalchuk,	is	a	member	of	the	Board.	NMG	holds	
shares	in	three	freely	available	television	channels	in	Russia:	it	has	25%	of	
shares	in	the	country’s	most	popular	Channel	1	(which	had	a	market	share	of	
11.5%	in	2016);	an	82%	stake	in	REN	TV	(6%	market	share)	and	a	72.4%	stake	in	
Channel	5	(5.9%	market	share).	The	Kovalchuk-controlled	holding	also	owns	
the	newspaper	Izvestia	(100%).
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from	most	of	their	Russian	assets	by	1	February	2017,	and	took	over	
many	of	those	assets58	–	at	no	financial	cost,	according	to	Russian	
media.	NMG	reportedly	took	over	those	assets	in	return	for	assur-
ances	to	its	foreign	partners	that	they	would	be	able	to	remain	on	
the	Russian	market,	obtain	broadcasting	frequencies,	comply	with	
the	new	legal	requirements,	and	receive	administrative	support.59 
58	 Acting	via	the	Media	Alliance	company	in	which	it	holds	an	80%	stake,	NMG	
has	taken	over	control	of	11	channels	available	in	Russia	of	the	US-based	
Discovery	corporation,	as	well	as	3	channels	of	the	Turner	Group	(including	
CNN).	NMG	has	also	taken	over	80%	of	shares	in	a	company	that	operated	12	
Russian-language	versions	of	channels	offered	by	the	Swedish	Viasat	hold-
ings.	Thanks	to	those	acquisitions,	in	2016	NMG’s	share	of	the	pay-TV	market	
in	Russia	rose	to	20%.
59	 For	more	information,	see	К.	Болецкая,	‘НМГ	собрала	20%	рынка	платного	
ТВ’,	Ведомости,	2	February	2016,	https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/
articles/2016/02/03/626532-nmg-platyaschih-zritelei
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iv. thE consEquEncEs of thE sanctions 
for thE PrEsidEnt’s innEr circlE and 
oWnErshiP rElations in russia
It	is	very	difficult	to	accurately	estimate	the	losses	suffered	as	a	re-
sult	of	the	sanctions	by	these	four	entrepreneurs	from	Vladimir	
Putin’s	inner	circle,	because	much	information	about	operations	
concerning	their	assets	remains	undisclosed.	Moreover,	the	im-
pact	of	the	Western	sanctions	has	been	compounded	by	the	eco-
nomic	crisis	in	Russia,	which	has	further	adversely	affected	the	
performance	 of	 Russian	 companies.	 Separating	 the	 impacts	 of	
those	two	factors	is	practically	impossible.	Forbes	rankings	show	
that	between	February	2014	and	April	2015	the	total	wealth	of	the	
men	in	question	decreased	by	over	a	third,	to	US$14.2	billion.	
Because	 of	 the	 sanctions,	 these	 entrepreneurs	 have	 had	 to	 scale	
down	 their	 foreign	 operations	 and	 put	 them	 under	 Russian	 ju-
risdiction.	 The	 men	 themselves	 and	 their	 assets	 became	 ‘toxic’,	
i.e.	 burdened	 with	 heightened	 risk.	 Even	 though	 most	 of	 them	
have	only	been	subject	to	sanctions	by	the	US,	they	have	still	been	
treated	with	caution	by	international	business	which	did	not	want	
to	endanger	its	deals	with	US	(or	European)	partners.	As	a	result,	
the	Russians	faced	difficulties	in	accessing	technologies	and	capi-
tal.	The	sanctions	turned	out	to	be	painful	for	the	Russian	elite,	not	
only	in	the	financial	dimension,	but	also	due	to	hard-to-quantify	
non-material	damage,	including	damage	to	their	image	and	pres-
tige	related	to	their	forced	relocation	to	Russia	and	the	restrictions	
on	travel,	which	have	undermined	their	international	position.
However,	 the	 financial	 operations	which	 the	 Russian	 oligarchs	
have	 undertaken	 have	 been	 successful	 in	 minimising	 losses	
abroad:	they	have	managed	to	avoid	freezes	on	most	of	their	as-
sets,	 or	 have	 succeeded	 in	 getting	 the	 restrictions	 lifted	 quite	
quickly.	The	 fact	 that	 the	 four	 men’s	 wealth	 was	 concentrated	
in	 Europe	was	 crucial	 for	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 losses	 they	 suffered.	
The	European	 sanctions	were	much	 less	heavy-handed	 that	 the	
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American	ones,	thanks	to	which	the	Russian	oligarchs	could	con-
tinue	doing	business	abroad,	either	directly	(like	Boris	Rotenberg	
or	Gennady	Timchenko)	or	via	intermediaries	(relatives	or	busi-
ness	partners).	Identifying	and	preventing	transactions	aimed	at	
circumventing	the	sanctions	turned	out	to	be	very	difficult,	and	
required	a	great	deal	of	determination	from	the	Western	states,	
because	of	the	opaque	ownership	structures	of	many	companies	
and	the	high	dynamics	of	ownership	transfers.
Because	the	sanctions	targeted	people	who	are	at	the	core	of	the	
Kremlin	 elite	 and	 most	 probably	 responsible	 for	 the	 personal	
wealth	 of	 the	 president	 and	 his	 relatives,	 the	 Kremlin	 became	
heavily	 involved	 in	 supporting	 the	 select	 group	 of	 persons	 fac-
ing	sanctions	from	the	very	start,	in	order	to	compensate	them	at	
least	partly	for	the	losses	suffered.	Measures	aimed	at	rebuilding	
the	wealth	of	Putin’s	 insiders	have	been	a	co-ordinated	element	
of	state	policy	 for	 the	 last	 four	years.	The	public	administration	
and	 the	 legislature	 became	 involved	 by	 enacting	 the	 necessary	
ordinances	and	laws,	while	the	state-owned	companies	did	their	
share	 by	 taking	 advantage	 of	 government	 contracts.	 Ambitious	
investment	 programmes	 by	 the	 state-owned	 corporations	 have	
for	the	most	part	been	implemented	by	a	select	group	of	private	
companies.	Public	funds	have	been	redistributed	within	a	narrow	
group	of	the	elite	and	the	companies	it	controlled	on	the	basis	of	
political	decisions,	while	competitive	mechanisms	have	been	al-
most	 completely	 excluded.	Moreover,	 the	 oligarchs	under	 sanc-
tions	were	granted	tax	exemptions	in	Russia,	in	return	for	which	
they	were	expected	to	participate	 in	projects	of	key	 importance	
for	 the	Kremlin,	 such	 as	 the	 development	 of	 Crimea	 (including	
the	construction	of	the	bridge	connecting	the	peninsula	with	Rus-
sia,	and	the	provision	of	banking	services	for	financial	operations	
in	Crimea).
The	oligarchs	have	been	assisted	by	the	state	despite	the	deterio-
rating	living	standards	in	Russia	and	dwindling	real	wages,	and	
in	many	cases	even	at	 the	expense	of	 the	general	public,	which	
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has	 in	many	cases	 led	to	outbursts	of	public	discontent.	The	de-
ployment	of	the	Platon	toll	system	by	Igor	Rotenberg’s	company,	
which	triggered	protests	by	truckers	throughout	the	country,	is	
a	 case	 in	point.	Despite	 the	 large	 scale	 of	 the	 carriers’	 protests,	
the	government	proceeded	to	carry	out	its	plans,	which	revealed	
where	 the	Kremlin’s	priorities	 are,	 and	how	 it	 is	determined	 to	
satisfy	the	ambitions	of	the	Russian	elite,	even	if	that	means	fac-
ing	popular	protests.	
Thanks	to	the	financial	operations	that	were	undertaken,	and	to	
the	Kremlin’s	 general	 support,	 the	wealth	of	 the	Russian	presi-
dent’s	insiders	has	been	growing	in	recent	years,	while	a	good	part	
of	that	wealth	is	now	concentrated	in	Russia.	According	to	Forbes	
rankings	 based	 on	 official	 figures	 concerning	 the	 assets	 of	 the	
two	hundred	wealthiest	Russians,	Gennady	Timchenko’s	wealth	
was	worth	US$16.8	billion	 in	early	 June	2018,	 i.e.	US$3.5	billion	
more	than	before	the	sanctions	and	the	crisis.	The	total	wealth	of	
the	Rotenberg	 family	has	been	estimated	at	US$4.87	billion,	 i.e.	
US$800	million	less	than	prior	to	the	crisis,	but	it	has	been	rising	
systematically	over	the	last	two	years.	Yuri	Kovalchuk,	whose	as-
sets	were	worth	US$1.24	billion	in	June	2018,	has	also	been	mak-
ing	up	for	the	losses,	although	the	value	of	his	wealth	is	still	lower	
than	before	the	crisis	(US$1.4	billion	in	February	2014).
The	special	support	from	the	state	has	been	available	only	to	se-
lected	oligarchs	 from	the	president’s	 inner	circle,	but	even	they	
cannot	take	it	for	granted,	as	indicated	by	the	declaration	of	loyal-
ty	to	the	president	made	by	Timchenko	in	August	2014.	Timchen-
ko	said	in	a	press	interview	that	he	was	ready	to	cede	his	assets	to	
the	state	if	necessary.60	On	the	one	hand	he	expressed	his	full	loy-
60	 See	 ‘Если	 понадобится,	 завтра	же	 передам	 все	 государству.	Или	на	
благотворительность’,	an	interview	with	Timchenko	in	Комсомольская 
правда,	4	August	2014,	https://www.kp.ru/daily/26264.5/3142757/.	A	similar	
declaration	of	loyalty	was	made	by	one	of	Russia’s	wealthiest	oligarchs	Oleg	
Deripaska	in	the	wake	of	the	Yukos	affair	in	2007.	Deripaska	said:	“If	the	state	
says	we	need	to	give	it	up,	we’ll	give	it	up.	I	don’t	separate	myself	from	the	
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alty	to	the	Kremlin,	and	on	the	other,	he	demonstrated	his	aware-
ness	that	he	could	not	possibly	retain	his	assets	if	the	government	
or	a	more	influential	elite	member	asked	for	them.	So	much	had	
already	been	demonstrated	by	the	case	of	Vladimir	Yakunin,	an-
other	presidential	insider	under	Western	sanctions,	who	has	lost	
control	 of	Russian	Railways,	 the	 state-owned	enterprise	he	had	
been	managing	for	the	last	ten	years,	in	unclear	circumstances	in	
mid-2015.61	
The	 support	 that	 oligarchs	 from	 Putin’s	 inner	 circle	 received	
in	 the	first	 years	 after	 the	 imposition	of	 the	first	wave	of	 sanc-
tions	stands	in	sharp	contrast	to	the	rather	restrained	reactions	
by	 the	 Russian	 leadership	 to	 the	 financial	 difficulties	 faced	 by	
other	Russian	billionaires	(including	Oleg	Deripaska	and	Viktor	
Vekselberg)	who	were	put	under	the	new	US	sanctions	 in	April	
2018.62	Even	though	the	sanctions	delivered	a	major	blow	to	 the	
companies	owned	by	those	oligarchs,	triggering	panic	on	the	Rus-
sian	stock	exchanges	and	currency	markets,	the	Kremlin	was	not	
only	 slow	 to	 help,63	 but	 also	 allowed	 state-owned	 corporations	
state.	I	have	no	other	interests.”	K.	Hille,	‘Oleg	Deripaska,	Russian	oligarch	
under	siege	for	Putin	ties’, Financial Times,	4	May	2018,	https://www.ft.com/
content/08f230b0-4dfb-11e8-8a8e-22951a2d8493
61	 The	Russian	media	have	implied	that	he	was	too	insistent	in	demanding	sub-
sidies	from	the	state’s	reserve	funds,	showing	no	appreciation	of	the	financial	
difficulties	in	which	the	Russian	economy	finds	itself.	Despite	losing	his	job,	
he	has	managed	to	retain	a	considerable	portion	of	his	wealth.	For	more	in-
formation,	see	K.	Chawryło,	‘Dymisja	szefa	Rosyjskich	Kolei	–	memento	dla	
elity’,	OSW Analyses,	26	August	2015,	https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/
analizy/2015-08-26/dymisja-szefa-rosyjskich-kolei-memento-dla-elity
62	 Most	of	the	oligarchs	who	were	put	under	sanctions	in	April	2018	had	built	
their	wealth	back	up	in	the	1990s.	Even	though	throughout	Putin’s	rule	they	
have	demonstrated	their	loyalty	and	readiness	to	share	their	resources,	in-
vesting	in	infrastructure	projects	important	for	the	state,	they	are	not	mem-
bers	of	the	president’s	inner	circle	of	friends.	
63	 In	May,	Viktor	Vekselberg	was	awarded	a	US$1	billion	loan	from	the	state-
owned	Promsvyazbank	to	repay	his	debt	 to	 foreign	banks	and	avoid	 los-
ing	 control	 of	 his	 business	 assets	 on	which	 those	 banks	 had	 a	 lien.	 See	
Д.	Коржова,	‘Ренова	Вексельберга	погасила	кредиты	в	западных	банках	
на	$1	млрд’,	Ведомости,	20	May	2018,	https://www.vedomosti.ru/business/
articles/2018/05/20/770058-renova-pogasila-krediti
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(VTB	Bank,	Avtovaz)	to	comply	with	the	US	sanctions	and	discon-
tinue	their	co-operation	with	those	companies,	which	further	ex-
acerbated	their	situation.64
The	flexible	circulation	of	assets	between	the	different	members	
of	 the	 Russian	 elite,	 including	 flows	 between	 private	 entrepre-
neurs	 and	 state-owned	 companies	 (such	 as	Gazprom	and	VTB),	
which	occurred	in	the	aftermath	of	the	sanctions	and	the	meas-
ures	 taken	 to	mitigate	 their	 impact,	 highlighted	 the	 close	 sym-
biosis	and	increasingly	blurred	boundaries	between	private	and	
state-owned	capital	in	Russia.	The	consolidation	of	the	state’s	role	
in	the	economy	has	been	accompanied	by	the	rise	of	selected	pri-
vate	companies	which	have	profited	from	co-operation	with	state-
owned	enterprises.	This	makes	the	picture	of	who	really	profits	
from	business	assets	in	Russia	even	more	opaque.	
Paradoxically,	the	Western	sanctions	have	also	had	positive	con-
sequences	for	the	Kremlin,	because	they	have	enabled	it	to	further	
increase	its	control	of	members	of	the	Russian	business	elite.	The	
sanctions	have	forced	the	oligarchs	to	settle	permanently	in	Rus-
sia	and	put	most	of	their	assets	under	Russian	jurisdiction.	This	is	
in	line	with	the	Kremlin’s	policy	of	de-offshoring,	which	aims	to	
persuade	Russian	businesses	to	stop	hiding	their	capital	in	tax	ha-
vens	and	repatriate	it	to	Russia.	In	the	aftermath	of	the	sanctions,	
the	dependence	of	business	on	the	Kremlin	has	increased.
Moreover,	 the	Western	sanctions	have	reinforced	 the	Kremlin’s	
policy	of	self-isolation	motivated	by	the	Russian	leadership’s	par-
anoid	 fear	 of	 an	 external,	Western	 threat	 to	 its	 grip	 on	 power.	
This	attitude	has	manifested	itself	in	the	ban	on	agricultural	and	
food	imports	from	the	West	and	the	policy	of	import	substitution,	
which	 has	 also	 facilitated	 the	 redistribution	 of	 public	 funds	 to	
64	 In	May	2018	the	VTB	Bank	announced	that	it	had	stopped	co-operation	with	
Deripaska’s	Rusal	concern	and	would	not	extend	any	new	loans	to	it,	while	
the	Avtovaz	automotive	holding	announced	that	it	was	seeking	new	alumin-
ium	suppliers	to	replace	Rusal.
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selected	companies	in	the	form	of	subsidies	and	cheap	loans,	and	
further	restrained	competition	for	foreign	products	and	services	
on	the	domestic	market	(to	the	benefit,	inter alia,	of	Timchenko’s	
agricultural	and	foods	businesses).	
The	many	efforts	made	by	the	Kremlin	in	recent	years	to	get	the	
sanctions	lifted	have	not	been	successful,	and	moreover,	Russia’s	
actions	 have	 provoked	 a	 further	 tightening	 of	 restrictions,	 es-
pecially	those	imposed	by	the	United	States.65	At	the	same	time,	
Washington’s	policy	 towards	Russia	has	become	much	 less	pre-
dictable,	and	the	successive	waves	of	sanctions	have	been	increas-
ingly	painful	to	business	in	Russia,	posing	a	mounting	threat	to	
the	stability	of	the	Russian	economy.	Meanwhile,	because	of	the	
considerable	asymmetry	in	Russian-US	economic	relations	(in	fa-
vour	of	the	United	States),	Moscow	has	had	very	little	room	to	ef-
fectively	respond	in	the	economic	dimension	to	the	United	States’	
sanctions	policy.	So	much	is	clear	from	the	provisions	on	retali-
atory	 measures	 that	 Russia	 could	 take	 against	 Washington	 as	
proposed	in	the	law	on	counter-sanctions,	or	the	proposal	to	pun-
ish	those	who	comply	with	US	sanctions	with	a	fine	or	imprison-
ment.66	Enforcing	those	provisions	would	hit	the	Russia	economy	
more	than	it	would	American	interests.	That	is	why	the	Russian	
65	 For	more	information,	see	I.	Wiśniewska,	S.	Kardaś,	‘Ustawa	o	amerykańskich	
sankcjach	 przeciwko	 Rosji’,	OSW Analyses,	 4	 August	 2017,	 https://www.
osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2017-08-04/ustawa-o-amerykanskich-
sankcjach-przeciwko-rosji;	I.	Wiśniewska,	‘Washington’s	game	of	‘sanctions	
poker’	Russia	awaits	America’s	decisions’,	OSW Commentary,	5	February	2018,	
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2018-02-05/
washingtons-game-sanctions-poker-russia-awaits-americas	and	M.	Men-
kiszak,	‘A	test	of	strength.	The	escalation	of	the	crisis	in	Russian-American	
relations’,	OSW Commentary,	 11	April	 2018,	 https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/osw-commentary/2018-04-11/a-test-strength-escalation-cri-
sis-russian-american-relations	
66	 Most	of	the	economic	retaliatory	measures	proposed	by	the	Russian	par-
liament	while	working	on	the	bill	were	much	more	harmful	to	the	Russian	
economy	than	the	United	States.	See	I.	Wiśniewska,	‘Russia’s	demonstrative	
response	to	US	sanctions’,	OSW Analyses,	23	May	2018,	https://www.osw.waw.
pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2018-05-23/russias-demonstrative-response-to-
us-sanctions	
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leadership	has	been	trying	first	and	foremost	to	ease	the	negative	
impacts	of	Western	sanctions	and	hamper	their	enforcement.	The	
government	of	the	Russian	Federation	has	been	mainly	concerned	
about	ensuring	the	secure	functioning	of	the	defence	and	security	
sectors,	and	to	this	end,	all	transactions	involving	defence	com-
panies	or	the	Ministry	of	Defence	have	been	made	secret.	Moreo-
ver,	the	financial	services	for	the	entire	defence	sector	have	been	
concentrated	in	one	bank,	the	state-owned	Promsvyazbank.	The	
government	has	also	offered	Russian	entrepreneurs	who	hold	for-
eign	assets	special	conditions	for	repatriating	and	investing	their	
capital	in	Russia.
Looking	at	the	costs	and	consequences	of	the	sanctions	for	Rus-
sia,	as	well	as	Moscow’s	responses	so	 far,	 it	seems	 likely	that	 in	
the	immediate	future,	the	Kremlin	will	continue	making	efforts	
to	 prevent	 the	 synchronisation	 of	 the	 European	 and	 American	
sanctions	policies	 towards	Russia.	Moscow	will	demonstrate	 its	
willingness	 to	 co-operate	with	European	partners,	while	 at	 the	
same	time	exploiting	the	divergences	of	interests	among	different	
European	states,	and	between	Brussels	and	Washington,	in	order	
to	prevent	a	new	tightening	of	European	sanctions	and	secure	the	
easing	of	the	existing	ones.	That	is	because	the	European	Union	
remains	Moscow’s	single	most	important	economic	partner.	
At	the	same	time,	the	Kremlin	will	try	to	prevent	a	further	escala-
tion	of	the	conflict	with	the	United	States;	this	will	be	the	aim	of	the	
new	meeting	between	Putin	and	Trump	that	Moscow	is	seeking.	
Apparently	the	Kremlin	still	believes	that	the	two	presidents	will	
be	able	to	develop	a	special	personal	relationship,	thanks	to	which	
it	will	be	possible	to	dissuade	the	US	president	from	tightening	the	
sanctions	policy	 towards	Russia	–	and	achieve	 the	extra	effect	of	
deepening	internal	political	divides	within	the	US	political	elite.	
A	 further	 expansion	of	 the	US	 sanctions	 could	be	 a	major	blow	
to	the	Russian	economy,	as	demonstrated	by	the	aftermath	of	the	
inclusion	of	Rusal	and	Oleg	Deripaska	on	the	US	sanctions	list	in	
P
O
IN
T 
O
F 
V
IE
W
  1
0/
20
18
52
April	2018.	Russia	is	only	beginning	to	recover	from	the	financial	
crisis;	despite	higher	oil	prices	it	has	been	unable	to	rebuild	its	fi-
nancial	resources,	and	is	not	in	a	position	to	help	all	the	oligarchs	
in	 distress	 (the	 US	 sanctions	 list	 includes	 around	 100	 Russian	
billionaires).	We	should	 therefore	expect	 that	 the	new	group	of	
Russian	oligarchs	sanctioned	by	the	United	States,	most	of	whom	
built	up	their	wealth	back	in	the	1990s,	will	not	receive	the	kind	of	
state	support	that	was	extended	to	President	Putin’s	friends.	The	
Kremlin	may	even	exploit	the	troubles	of	the	Russian	oligarchs	to	
strip	them	of	some	of	their	assets	and	start	a	new	wave	of	owner-
ship	transfers	in	Russia.	Deripaska	has	already	withdrawn	from	
the	management	boards	of	his	companies,	and	is	considering	scal-
ing	down	his	stakes,	as	a	result	of	which	some	shares	will	most	
probably	be	taken	over	by	state-owned	enterprises.67
The	 limited	 opportunities	 for	 foreign	 expansion	 that	 Russian	
businesses	have,	combined	with	a	further	tightening	of	sanctions	
against	the	oligarchs,	may	trigger	a	mounting	rivalry	among	the	
members	of	the	Russian	elite	over	the	available	business	assets,	
with	the	group	of	potential	beneficiaries	becoming	ever	narrower.
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